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NOTE
In Defense of Surrogate Parenting:
A Critical Analysis of the Recent
Kentucky Experience
INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years humans have tried to prevent con-
ception. Yet it is only in the last century that scientific efforts
to aid conception have begun.' Artificial insemination,2 surro-
gate motherhood' and, most recently, test-tube babies 4 have
become realities; embryo transplants and artificial wombs are
not far behind.5 As a result of great strides in science and
medical technology, new breakthroughs in human reproduc-
tion occur on an almost daily basis." Since one of every five
' Taylor, New Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1980, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 46 [hereinafter cited as New Frontiers].
2 See generally W. FINEGOLD, ARTICIAL INSEMINATON (1976); Shaman, Legal
Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331 (1979-80); Yussman, Principles
and Procedures of Artificial Insemination, 5 CoNTEmp. OB/GYN 107 (1975).
2 See generally Cassidy, Brave New Child, BLUEGRASS WOMAN, Oct.-Nov., 1980,
at 20; Markoutsas, Women Who Have Babies for Other Women, GOOD HOUSEKEEP-
ING, Apr., 1981, at 96; New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 46; Hiring Mothers, TIME, June
5, 1978, at 59.
According to Dr. Marvin Yussman, head of the Department of Reproductive En-
docrinology at the University of Louisville, the term "surrogate mother" is medically
correct only when used to describe the result when an embryo recovered from one
womb is implanted in another. Cassidy, supra, at 65. For purposes of this Note, how-
ever, the term "surrogate mother," as well as the term "surrogate parenting," will be
used to refer to women who are carrying babies artificially conceived for other
women.
' See generally All About That Baby, NEwsWEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 66; The First
Test Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58; N.Y. Times, July 26, 1978, § 1, at 1, col.
5. Test-tube fertilization is more accurately referred to as in vitro fertilization.
5 New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 55, 59-60.
8 Dr. Patrick C. Steptoe delivered the first recorded test-tube baby, Louise
Brown. Subsequently he declared: "The whole field of human reproduction has been
transformed." New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 46.
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couples of childbearing age in the United States is infertile,
any advancement is destined to affect a substantial portion of
the population.8
Understandably, the law has been reluctant to react to
changes in an area as nebulous as conception.9 Recent events
in Kentucky, however, have thrust the courts squarely into
this uncharted territory. The culmination of these events
came in late January of 1981 when the Attorney General of
Kentucky brought a civil suit to have surrogate parenting de-
clared illegal in the Commonwealth." Although potential legal
consequences flowing from progress in the field of human re-
production are myriad, the discussion herein is limited to
those problems created by surrogate parenting generally, with
particular emphasis upon the legal ramifications arising from
this arrangement in Kentucky.
Initially, this Note will describe surrogate parenting in
general by focusing on what it is, who is doing it, and where it
is being done. In so doing, the particular events leading up to
the pending lawsuit in Kentucky will be detailed. Second, the
I Id. at 52. It is estimated that six million couples of childbearing age are infer-
tile in the United States. Id. Other sources have estimated this number at one in
every six couples, or 15% of the population. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22; Salvato,
Surrogate Mothers, Ky. Post, Mar. 2, 1981, § K, at 1, col. 3.
8 Physicians, scientists, fertile participants (i.e., surrogates and semen donors)
and the resulting children, as well as the infertile couple, will all be substantially
affected by scientific and legal developments in human reproduction.
The availability of adoption does not significantly reduce the number of infertile
couples interested in alternative methods of conception. Abortion and birth control
have caused a severe shortage in the number of normal infants available for adoption.
A couple desiring to adopt a normal infant in Kentucky must wait an average of four
to six years. The Department of Human Resources maintains 1,200 couples on its
waiting list, fulfilling about 300 requests each year. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 62.
George Annas, professor of law and medicine at Boston University, recently
stated: "There is no rush to legislate any of the alternative forms of conception. Peo-
ple have seen enough premature legislation; this time they are Willing to wait and see.
Something's got to go wrong first." New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 53.
Over 20,000 births a year are attributable to artificial insemination, Sperm Do-
nors: Possible Perils, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 1979, at 72, yet only 20 states have enacted
statutes dealing with the legalities of this procedure. See note 201 infra for a compre-
hensive list of these statutes.
11 Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. 81-CI-0121 (Ky.,
Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981). See text accompanying notes 51-72 infra for a dis-
cussion of the events precipitating this lawsuit and its ultimate dismissal.
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Kentucky Attorney General's Opinion, which concludes that
surrogate parenting is illegal and contractually unenforceable
in Kentucky, will be examined. This Opinion provides the ba-
sis for the current lawsuit filed on behalf of the State. Third,
the far-reaching effects that the Opinion and the lawsuit could
have on the widely accepted practice of artificial insemination
in Kentucky will be examined. Finally, constitutional objec-
tions to state controls on surrogate parenting will be explored.
I. THE CURRENT PRACTICE
A. Surrogate Parenting in General
From a medical perspective, surrogate parenting is a rela-
tively simple procedure. It is accomplished through the use of
artificial insemination (hereinafter AI), a tried, true and in-
creasingly common alternative method of conception in the
United States today.11 In the "usual" AI procedure, the wife
of a sterile male is injected with the semen of an unrelated
donor.2 The donor and the couple13 never meet, and in most
cases, only the doctor and the couple are aware that AI played
any part in the resulting birth. 4
The surrogate parenting situation involves the reverse of
the usual AI procedure and is necessary in cases where the
female is the infertile partner. In such cases, semen from the
fertile husband is used to artificially inseminate another wo-
man, who becomes the "surrogate mother." Usually she car-
ries the child to term and then terminates her parental rights
" Yussman, supra note 2, at 107. See also Shaman, supra note 2, at 331. See
notes 162-225 infra for a discussion of artificial insemination.
12 The semen is injected into the uterus, cervical canal and vagina. The entire
procedure takes less than three minutes, and there is no pain. Salvato, supra note 7,
at 8A.
13 Surrogate parenting is not necessarily limited to "couples." Just as artificial
insemination has been available to single women, the surrogate arrangement could
allow single men to become fathers. This Note, however, will refer only to a "couple"
wishing to engage a surrogate mother for the purposes of childbearing. The couple
consists of a fertile male and an infertile female.
14 Interview with Marvin A. Yussman, M.D., Director of the Department of Re-
productive Endocrinology at the University of Louisville, in Louisville, Kentucky
(Mar. 24, 1981). Due to the secrecy surrounding the procedure, the exact number of
Al births is difficult to determine. Shaman, supra note 2, at 331.
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in favor of the natural father, who was the donor of the
sperm. The wife of the natural father is then able to adopt the
child. 5
The idea of surrogate parenting is by no means novel.
The first recorded case was Biblical: "When Abraham wanted
an heir, his barren wife, Sarah, sent him to Hagar, her young
Egyptian handmaiden, who bore him Ishmael."'16 Through the
years childless couples have quietly been making such ar-
rangements, with sisters bearing children for sisters, and
friends for friends.7 It is only recently, however, that surro-
gate arrangements have come into the public eye,"8 and the
exact number of women who have served as modern-day sur-
rogates is unknown.' It has been estimated that there have
been at least ten official surrogate births in recent years.20 Al-
though the number of surrogates now pregnant is also in dis-
pute, it is clearly substantial.2 '
" See generally Cassidy, supra note 3, at 20; Comment, Contracts to Bear a
Child, 66 CALIF. L. RE V. 611 (1978).
16 Genesis 16:1-16.
17 See Seligmann, Pregnancy by Proxy, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 72; Witt, A
Detroit Lawyer Finds Proxy Mothers For Childless Couples Who Desperately Want
to be Parents, PEOPLE WEEKLY, June 12, 1978, at 71.
18 Recent publicity is in part due to greater social acceptance of AL. Doctors and
lawyers are becoming more inclined to "go public" and bring infertile couples and
potential surrogates together.
'1 Noel Keane, an attorney in Dearborn, Michigan, was approached in 1976 by a
couple seeking a surrogate to bear them a child. He researched the matter and discov-
ered two similar cases. Appearing on a local radio show to solicit a surrogate mother
for his clients, he received a call from a couple who announced: "We've already done
it." The call was from a Detroit area couple who became parents when their best
friend bore a child for them through AL. They had performed the AI themselves.
(The friend subsequently bore a second child for the couple.) Witt, supra note 17, at
72. Surrogate births have been unrecorded for the most part; it is only recently that
the persons involved are publicizing the arrangement.
20 Ward, In Pursuit of a Baby, Courier-Journal, Mar. 29, 1981, § G, at 1, col. 1.
This figure includes neither the child of a California surrogate due to deliver in the
spring of 1981 nor a child born to a Louisville surrogate which child subsequently
died. The child was one of twins. Id.
21 Case histories of several pregnant surrogates are presented in Markoutsas,
supra note 3, at 98-99. See also Ruffini, Five N.Y. Couples Engage 'Proxy' Mothers,
N.Y. Post, Dec. 4, 1980, § B, at 8, col. 1.
Moreover, surrogate parenting is apparently not even limited to this country.
See, e.g., Cusine, "Womb-Leasing". Some Legal Implications, 128 NEw L.J. 824
(1978) (England); Lang, Pregnancy by Proxy, Cinn. Enquirer, Jan. 14, 1981, § D, at 5,
col. 1. (Argentina).
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Surrogate parenting is not limited to one state or even to
one area of the country.22 Kentucky and Michigan, however,
are emerging as leaders in the field as a result of organizations
recently formed in these states to facilitate the surrogate pro-
cess. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. 23  (hereinafter
"SPA") in Louisville, Kentucky, and Surrogate Family Ser-
vices, Inc.,24 located in Dearborn, Michigan, are separate orga-
nizations providing basically the same service: they match in-
fertile couples with potential surrogate mothers. The two
organizations achieve like goals by quite different means and
have adopted philosophies fundamentally diverse in certain
respects.
SPA was formed by Dr. Richard M. Levin, a Louisville
infertility specialist, in April, 1980.25 SPA has been responsi-
ble for at least two surrogate births and one other pending
pregnancy. The exact number of pregnancies in progress at-
tributable to the organization is estimated at figures ranging
from one to one hundred.26 Despite this uncertainty, it is clear
that a substantial number of childless couples and potential
surrogates are in contact with the association.
Dr. Levin, the driving force behind SPA, will accept any
reputable couple who cannot have children of their own. 28 The
22 Surrogate births in the United States have been recorded in California, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, New York, and Tennessee.
2: See generally Lang, supra note 21, at D5; Salvato, supra note 7, at 1K; Selig-
mann, supra note 17, at 72.
24 See generally Marcus, The Baby Maker, NAT. L.J., Aug. 28, 1980, at 2; Selig-
mann, supra note 17, at 72. C
21 Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. 81-CI-0121 (Ky.,
Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981) (SPA's Articles of Incorporation are appended as
Exhibit A to the complaint.) Dr. Levin and Karen Zena, company secretary, are the
only stockholders. Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5. According to Dr.
Levin, SPA first began to realize a profit in the beginning of 1981. Salvato, supra note
7, at 8A.
26 Compare Ward, supra note 20, at 1 with Lang, supra note 21, at 15 and
Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 5.
1 See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 3, at 24; Seligmann, supra note 17, at 72; Ward,
supra note 20, at 1, col. 4.
"' Dr. Levin has stated:
We take everybody who makes an appointment, unless of course the person
were psychotic or something. If he had falling down pathology, I wouldn't
accept him. But I believe people have the right of procreation. Adolph
Hitler tried to select who will have children and who will not. Adoption
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
couple is asked to list the traits that the surrogate mother
should have.29 This list is matched with computerized lists of
surrogates, and the couple receives dossiers on three potential
surrogates. The couple then makes its own decision based on
the surrogates' medical, psychiatric, educational and profes-
sional backgrounds. 0 To be accepted by Dr. Levin as a poten-
tial surrogate, a woman must be married with normal children
of her own,3 1 pass a battery of physical and psychiatric exami-
nations 2 and be represented by her own attorney.3 3 Lengthy
contracts are prepared and signed by all the parties,3 with
these documents outlining the rights and responsibilities of all
participants.3 5 The contract contains provisions to insure that
the child will be born healthy 6 and to facilitate the surro-
gate's relinquishment of parental rights." Basically, the surro-
gate agrees to have the natural father's name placed on the
child's birth certificate as the biological father. 8 The natural
father agrees to pay the surrogate's medical expenses and a
agencies select. I take them as they come.
Lang, supra note 21, at D5.
19 These traits include blood type (mandatory), height, weight, hair and eye
color, and ethnic origin. The traits specified usually match the characteristics of the
couple, but this does not always occur. Elizabeth Kane, Dr. Levin's first surrogate
mother, was chosen partially because she was tall and the couple wished to compen-
sate for their being on the "short side." Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22.
30 Seligmann, supra note 17, at 72.
31 Marcus, supra note 24, at 17. Dr. Levin believes married surrogates are "more
emotionally stable and less likely to want to keep the children." Id.
32 Lang, supra note 21, at D5; Seligmann, supra note 17, at 72.
3 Marcus, supra note 24, at 17. The couple is also represented by counsel. Ward,
supra note 20, at 1, col. 5.
U The parties include the couple, the surrogate and her husband, and the physi-
cian. The surrogate's husband agrees to the arrangement and to give up all parental
rights in the resulting child. See sample SPA contract, Complaint, exhibit C, Com-
monwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Civ. No. 81-CI-0121, at U-III (Ky.,
Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981) [hereinafter referred to as Contract].
'B Contract, supra note 34. See generally Cassidy, supra note 3, at 24.
s The surrogate mother must agree to a specified number of pre-natal medical
examinations and further agree not to smoke, drink alcoholic beverages, or use any
drug without the written consent of Dr. Levin. Contract, supra note 34, at % XXIV.
She further contracts that she will not abort the child. Id. at I XX.
-' Specifically, the surrogate mother and her husband agree to institute proceed-
ings on the fifth day after delivery, or as soon thereafter as possible, to terminate
their respective parental rights. Contract, supra note 34, at III.
38 Id.
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pre-arranged fee 9 The parties never meet or learn each
other's names.4
In Dearborn, Michigan, a similar service is provided by
Surrogate Family Services, Inc. 41 (hereinafter "SFS"). SFS
was recently established by Noel Keane,'42 a Dearborn attor-
ney responsible for a number of surrogate arrangements, and
Katie Brophy, 3 a Louisville attorney who formerly worked
with Dr. Levin. SFS operates on a slightly different concept
than does Kentucky's SPA. Services are offered to childless
couples outside Kentucky, and doctors in the surrogate's
home state provide the medical services.45 In contrast to Dr.
Levin's approach, no formal contracts are executed. The
couple and the surrogate sign a twelve line "Statement of Un-
derstanding" that outlines the arrangements and provides
that "actual and legal custody of the child" will go to the
childless couple. 46 No fee other than medical expenses is paid
to the surrogate mother; she provides her services strictly on a
31 The exact amount of the fee paid to a surrogate mother has never been dis-
closed. It is estimated at $10,000. Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22. But see Salvato, supra
note 7, at 8A ($13,000).
40 The contract specifically provides that the couple and surrogate may not
"seek" each other out. Contract, supra note 34, at U1 XIV, XV. There is some dis-
pute, however, concerning SPA's policy regarding this prohibition. Compare Selig-
mann, supra note 17, at 72 with Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A.
41 See generally Marcus, supra note 24, at 2; Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A; Selig-
mann, supra note 17, at 72.
42 Noel Keane has been involved in surrogate parenting for at least four years,
well before all the publicity surrounding the surrogate births in Louisville. He claims
responsibility for handling at least eight such births. A partner in a two-man firm,
Keane had not even handled an adoption case prior to becoming involved with the
surrogate procedure. Presently, he has contracted to co-author a book on the subject,
has appeared numerous times on national television in defense of surrogate parenting
and continues to lecture at medical conferences. See generally Cassidy, supra note 3,
at 24; Marcus, supra note 24, at 2; Ward, supra note 20, at 1, col. 6.
43 Katie Brophy is an attorney in the Louisville firm of Greene & Triplette. She
worked closely with Dr. Levin in the early stages of his work with surrogate parent-
ing, mainly researching the law and drafting contracts. Brophy subsequently split
with Dr. Levin and began her own surrogate service with Noel Keane. See generally
Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22, 24; Ward, supra note 20, at 1, col. 1.
44 SFS is also incorporated; Keane and Brophy are both shareholders in the com-
pany. Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 3.
45 Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 4. SFS claims that its clients can
save substantially on travel expenses. Id. at 18, col. 5.
46 Marcus, supra note 24, at 17.
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voluntary basis. It is also possible for the surrogate and the
couple to meet and get to know each other.4 Like SPA, SFS
requires extensive medical and psychological testing of its
"host mothers. ' 49 SFS is presently responsible for "between
three and five" surrogate pregnancies.5°
B. Surrogate Parenting in Kentucky
Wife, unable to conceive, looking for woman who would
agree to be artificially inseminated with semen of husband
and then give child to couple. All responses confidential, all
expenses paid. Please state fee expected .... 51
This classified advertisment appeared in a Louisville
newspaper on November 24, 1979. It resulted in the first re-
corded "surrogate birth" in Kentucky52 and created immedi-
ate controversy. 53 The advertisement was placed in the paper
on behalf of a couple who desperately wanted a child of their
own 54 but who were unable to conceive due to the wife's infer-
tility. The couple, known only as "Ralph" and "Emily Rans-
dale," 5 approached Dr. Levin5" one Sunday morning in July,
47 An informal opinion by Judge James Lincoln construed MICH. Cosu'. LAws
ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1981), a Michigan statute forbidding payment in connection
with an adoption, to prohibit paying money to a surrogate. Hiring Mothers, supra
note 3, at 59. Keane challenged this interpretation in court, but his arguments were
rejected. Judge Roman S. Gibbs held that contracts to pay surrogates are in violation
of public policy and are unenforceable. Doe v. Kelley, Civ. No. 78-815-531 CZ (Mich.,
Wayne Cir., filed May 15, 1978).
48 Seligmann, supra note 17, at 72; Surrogate Motherhood Isn't Child's Play,
But She's Game, Dallas Morning News, July 10, 1980, § A, at 4, col. 1. But see
Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 3.
" Keane prefers to call his surrogates "host mothers." Salvato, supra note 7, at
8A, col. 4.
:o Ward, supra note 20, at 1, col. 4.
1 Courier-Journal, November 24, 1979, Home Marketplace Supp., at 9, col. 13.
2 For a discussion of the Elizabeth Kane birth, see text accompanying notes 59-
64 infra.
53 See Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. 81-CI-0121
(Ky., Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981); Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 (1981); Courier-
Journal, Feb. 1, 1981, § D, at 2, col. 1.
" See generally Cassidy, supra note 3, at 22; Ward, Surrogate Mother Will Help
a Couple Realize Their Dream, Courier-Journal, Feb. 11, 1980, § D, at 3, col. 1.
8" "Ralph" and "Emily Ransdale" are fictitious names used by the couple to pro-
tect their privacy. The two have been married for ten years and have been struggling
vainly for nine of those years to have children. While they have one adopted child,
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1979, and requested his help in their struggle to have a
child.57 After all the options were discussed, Dr. Levin, work-
ing with Attorney Brophy, placed the ad in the newspaper.
There were many responses,"8 and on March 2, 1980, "Eliza-
beth Kane," 9 a 37 year old housewife from Illinois, was artifi-
cally inseminated with the semen of Ralph Ransdale. e0 Prior
to the insemination, the surrogate mother, her husband, the
Ransdales and Dr. Levin signed a contract prepared by
Brophy."
On November 9, 1980, Elizabeth Kane gave birth to a boy
at Louisville's Audubon Hospital.6 2 Five days later in Jeffer-
son Circuit Court, she and her husband terminated all paren-
tal rights regarding the child63 and returned home to Illinois.6 4
Mr. Ransdale desperately wanted a biologically related child; Mrs. Ransdale wanted
one for him. Ward, supra note 54, at 3.
" Dr. Richard Levin graduated from the University of Louisville medical school
and also studied at the Harvard and Yale medical schools. He maintains his fertility
practice along with SPA. Married with four daughters of his own, Levin has deep
sympathy for couples who cannot have children:
I think God meant for us to build, create and improve the quality of
human nature. Sure we're tampering with nature.... But every doctor is
trained to tamper with nature. You tamper when a baby gets stuck in the
birth canal.
It's just when you're dealing with sex and reproduction that some peo-
ple say it's inappropriate.
Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 4. See generally id. at 1K.
11 Id. at 1K.
"8 Ward, "I Feel Fulfilled," Courier-Journal, Nov. 15, 1980, § B, at 1, col. 1. One
news article reports the number of responses at 30. Salvato, supra note 7, at 1K, col.
4.
's "Elizabeth Kane" is the pseudonym that the surrogate mother uses to protect
her privacy. She is married with three children and volunteered to be a surrogate for
the Ransdales because:
It seems so often a person reads about things in the paper - death,
illness, famine - things that you think, oh I wish I could help, and you're
totally helpless. When I read about this, I thought 'Gee, I can help these
people.' This is one thing that I can do as a Christian and a healthy woman.
Ward, supra note 58, at 8. After the birth Mrs. Kane reported that she felt "ful-
filled." She regretted that she was not ten years younger so that she could do it again.
Id.
so Cassidy, supra note 3, at 24.
6 Id. See also Contract, supra note 34.
82 Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 1.
'3 Ward, supra note 58, at B6.
" Although Mrs. Kane was greeted warmly by her immediate family upon arriv-
ing home, she received a "generally icy" reception from the townspeople. She and her
1980-81]
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The long-awaited child was taken home by his natural father
and Mrs. Ransdale, who was soon to become his adoptive
mother. 5
Dr. Levin originally planned only to be involved in the
delivery of the one child. Due to the publicity surrounding the
birth, however, he was deluged with requests for his services
from childless couples all over the world. After much consid-
eration he decided to offer the service to other couples, 6 and
SPA was soon formed.
Closely following the first surrogate birth in Kentucky,
the State Attorney General, Steven Beshear, issued an opin-
ion advising that surrogate parenting is illegal in Kentucky. 7
The Opinion was issued on January 26, 1981, in response to a
request by the Courier-Journal, the Louisville newspaper that
had run the original advertisement.6 8 On January 27, 1981, the
Attorney General filed a civil suit6 9 in Franklin Circuit Court
to have surrogate parenting declared illegal in Kentucky.70 A
second complaint was filed on March 12, 1981, seeking the in-
children were snubbed and taunted; it was rumored her husband lost his job because
of her actions; and her own parents accused her of giving away their grandson.
Markoutsas, supra note 3, at 96; Ward, supra note 58, at B1.
65 Id.
66 Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 1. At least two more children have been born
to surrogates in Louisville since Elizabeth Kane gave birth, although there is dis-
agreement over the exact number. Ward, supra note 20, at 1.
17 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 (1981). The Opinion was issued on Jan. 26, 1981.
68 Courier-Journal, Jan. 27, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 1. Despite receiving legal assur-
ance from its own attorneys when it published the surrogate advertisement, the edi-
tors were concerned about its legality.
69 The Attorney General filed a civil suit rather than a criminal one because it
was not his intention to "have any detrimental effect" on those who have already had
a child by a surrogate or those who have contracted with a surrogate who is now
pregnant. "I don't want to cause those people any harm. It would be pretty hard for
them to back out now." Courier-Journal, Jan. 28, 1981, § A, at 18, col. 5.
70 Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. 81-CI-0121 (Ky.,
Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981).
Lawsuits concerning surrogate parenting are also pending in other states. In Cali-
fornia, a paternity-custody suit has been brought after a divorced surrogate mother
changed her mind and decided she would like to keep the baby. The natural father is
suing for custody. Whose Baby Is It, Anyway?, NEWswEEK, Apr. 6, 1981, at 83; Lex-
ington Herald-Leader, Mar. 22, 1981, § A, at 2, col. 2. In Michigan, Noel Keane was
unsuccessful in his appeal from the unfavorable decision he received in Doe v. Kelley.
Doe v. Attorney General, No. 50380 (Mich., decided May 5, 1981).
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voluntary dissolution of SPA.7 1 As of the date of this writing,
the first suit has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.7 2 In
the meantime, SPA continues to match childless couples with
surrogate mothers, and the legal status of surrogate parenting
in Kentucky remains in limbo. An examination of the relevant
Kentucky statutes and the common law of this and sister
states, however, illustrates that the Attorney General's Opin-
ion is improperly reasoned and compels the conclusion that
surrogate parenting is legal in Kentucky.
II. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF OAG 81-18
Kentucky's Attorney General came down emphatically
against the surrogate parenting arrangement utilized in the
Elizabeth Kane pregnancy.7 '3 That analysis will undoubtedly
be relied upon in the pending suit against SPA 4 as well as in
future attacks upon surrogate parenting everywhere. The fol-
lowing discussion will detail the reasoning of the Attorney
General, critique his approach and suggest an alternative
analysis that would better reconcile the competing interests
involved.
The conclusion of Opinion of the Attorney General 81-18
(hereinafter "OAG" or the "Opinion") is that contracts be-
tween married couples and a surrogate mother for the artifi-
cial insemination of the surrogate by the husband, with the
understanding that the surrogate will terminate her parental
rights shortly after the birth of a resulting child, are "illegal
and unenforceable in Kentucky. 7 5 The Attorney General
supports this determination through his reading of the ex-
press provisions of several Kentucky statutes and by reference
7, Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ. No. 81-CI-0429 (Ky.,
Franklin Cir., filed Mar. 12, 1981).
72 Order Dismissing, Commonwealth v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc., Civ.
No. 81-CI-0121 (Ky., Franklin Cir., filed Jan. 27, 1981). See also Ward, supra note 20,
at 3, col. 4. In addition, a motion to intervene was filed by an infertile couple desiring
to hire a surrogate mother. Courier-Journal, supra note 71, at 1, col. 4. The action
cited in note 71 supra was still in discovery in March 1982.
71 See Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18 (1981).
74 See the text accompanying notes 67-72 supra for a discussion of the suits filed
against SPA by Kentucky's Attorney General.
71 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
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to a strong public policy against "baby-buying" in the state.76
This Note will demonstrate: (1) that the typical surrogate
parenting contract violates none of Kentucky's statutes; (2)
that the Attorney General has construed Kentucky's public
policy against baby-buying too broadly and has ignored other
legitimate policies which favor freedom of contract, parental
custody, and step-parent adoption; (3) that the Opinion disre-
gards case law that declares custody contracts to be legal; and
(4) that the Attorney General's analysis completely ignores
the fundamental difference between void and merely voidable
contracts77  and thus erroneously equates illegality with
unenforceability.
A. Overview of OAG 81-18
The Attorney General first relies on Kentucky statutory
authority to construct his case against surrogate parenting
contracts. Kentucky has two statutory procedures, similar in
nature, whereby a parent may voluntarily terminate his or her
rights and obligations as such.78 A parent may either consent
to the adoption of a child7 9 or file a petition to terminate his
or her parental rights.80 The OAG initially notes that neither
consent to adoption s' nor a petition for voluntary termination
of parental rights may be filed prior to five days after the
birth of a child. 2 From this premise it is argued that a surro-
gate parenting contract utilizing either statutory scheme
would be illegal since it would necessarily require some kind
of consent on the part of the surrogate prior to conception
76 Id.
7 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 13.1 (1973); 15 S. Wm-
LISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1770 (3d ed. 1972).
18 See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.520(2) (1977) [hereinafter cited as KRS] ("Upon en-
try of the judgment of adoption, . . . the child shall be deemed the child of petition-
ers. . . ."); KRS § 199.613(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) ("Where parental rights have been
terminated ... all legal relationships between the parents and child shall cease to
exist, . . . except that the child shall retain the right to inherit from its parents...
until the child is adopted.").
79 KRS § 199.500 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
"0 KRS § 199.601 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
81 KRS § 199.500(5) (Cune. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
82 KRS § 199.601(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
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itself.s3
The Attorney General's ultimate conclusion is then rein-
forced by reference to the strong public policy against the
buying and selling of children.8 First, four cases from other
jurisdictions are cited for the proposition that natural parents
should not profit monetarily from adoption.85 Second, an ad-
ditional Kentucky statute is quoted to further demonstrate
the public policy against surrogate parenting. This statute is
Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter cited as KRS) section
199.590(2),86 which states: "No person, agency, or institution
not licensed by the department may charge a fee or accept
remuneration for the procurement of any child for adoption
purposes. '8 7 Additional reliance is placed on the first subsec-
tion of that statute, which prohibits any newspaper advertise-
ment that "solicits children for adoption or solicits the cus-
tody of children.""" The policy argument of the Opinion closes
by emphatically stating: "The public policy behind these stat-
utes is clear: The Commonwealth of Kentucky does not con-
done the purchase and sale of children."8 9
B. Critique of OAG 81-18
1. Reliance on Express Provisions of Kentucky Statutes
The Attorney General was correct in recognizing that a
surrogate parenting contract might rely on either a surrogate's
termination of parental rights or her consent to an adoption.90
The contractual arrangements sponsored by SPA, however,
call exclusively for the termination of parental rights."1 Any
Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 3 (1981).
84 Id. at 4.
8' Reimche v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975); In re
Shirk's Estate, 350 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed, 363 P.2d 461 (Kan. 1961);
In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. 1978); Barwin v. Reidy, 307
P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957).
8" KRS § 199.590(2) (1977).
87 Id.
88 KRS § 199.590(1) (1977).
89 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 5 (1981).
11 See the text accompanying notes 79-82 supra for a discussion of the Attorney
General's treatment of these procedures.
01 See Contract, supra note 34, at % III for a description of the surrogate's con-
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reference to Kentucky's adoption statutes, therefore, merely
muddies the waters unnecessarily. There is a fundamental dif-
ference between the five-day requirement in the adoption
statute and the similar requirement in the statute providing
for voluntary termination of parental rights. The former is
quite explicit: "In no case shall an adoption be granted or con-
sent for adoption be held valid if such consent for adoption is
given prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child. '9 2 The
latter merely requires that no termination petition be filed
before the five-day period elapses.9 3 Elizabeth Kane filed a pe-
tition in district court to terminate her parental rights five
days after the birth of her child, just as the contract and the
statute contemplate. 4 Furthermore, even if it is assumed that
the child will eventually be adopted by the natural father's
wife, 5 it is clear that the surrogate's sworn consent to such
adoption would not be required at any time should she termi-
nate her rights pursuant to KRS section 199.601.16
Thus, the argument that the two five-day delay statutes
are expressly violated by surrogate contracts is not persuasive.
If a contract required the surrogate's consent to adoption
prior to conception, or if consent to adoption was the only rec-
ognized method for voluntarily relinquishing parental rights,
that contract might indeed violate Kentucky law. Neither sit-
uation is present in SPA arrangements, as evidenced by the
Elizabeth Kane contract. Such contracts contemplate only
that the surrogate fie the necessary termination petition at
tractual commitment.
92 KRS § 199.500(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
93 KRS § 199.601(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
"' See Ward, supra note 58.
" The contract with the surrogate mother contains a recital which states that
"the Surrogate and her husband shall do all acts necessary to permit the adoption of
said child by any party, upon request by the Natural Father." Contract, supra note
34, at HI.
-6 KRS § 199.500(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982) provides
in part:
No adoption shall be granted without the sworn consent ... of the mother
of the child born out of wedlock,. . . except that such consent of the living
parent or parents shall not be required if:
(b) The parental rights of such parents have been terminated under KRS
199.601 to 199.617.
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the proper time.
2. Reliance on Public Policy
The Attorney General correctly notes that public policy
offers a stronger argument against surrogate parenting than
do the express provisions of the Kentucky statutes. 7 None-
theless, OAG 81-18 goes too far when it declares surrogate
parenting contracts to be illegal on the basis of Kentucky's
policy against "baby-buying." Any policy argument is cheap-
ened greatly by superficial reliance on inflammatory labels.
Public policy is not a one-way street; there are legitimate poli-
cies that are served by a less restrictive approach to surrogate
parenting contracts. It should also be noted that there is a
heavy burden placed upon anyone attempting to void a con-
tract on public policy grounds:
[C]ontracts voluntarily made between competent persons
are not to be set aside lightly. As the right of private con-
tract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, the usual
and most important function of courts is to enforce and
maintain contracts rather than to enable parties to escape
their obligations on the pretext of public policy or
illegality. 8
Thus, there is a legal presumption that people will be permit-
ted to order their affairs by agreement.
a. Extra-jurisdictional cases evidencing public policy
The Attorney General primarily relies on four extrajuris-
dictional cases to support his public policy argument.9 9 All of
'7Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 3 (1981).
98 Zeitz v. Foley, 264 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Ky. 1954). "Public policy is an unruly
horse which courts are loath to ride unless it is necessary." Hennis v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 349 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Ky. 1961). The Hennis Court continued:
The law looks with favor upon the making of contracts between competent
parties upon valid consideration and for lawful purposes. Public policy has
its place in the law of contracts, - yet that will-o'-the-wisp of the law var-
ies and changes with the interests, habits, need, sentiments and fashions of
the day, and courts are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the
ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain.
Id. at 681-82 (quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. 1954)).
9' See note 85 supra for a listing of these cases.
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these cases arise in an adoption context, and thus none of
them entails the termination of parental rights that would oc-
cur in Kentucky. Additionally, the holdings are colored by the
different statutory makeup of each state. Nonetheless, the
cases are very instructive and in fact go a long way toward
discrediting the very proposition for which they are cited.
The first two cases, Barwin v. Reidy'0 0 and Matter of
Adoption of a Child by LT.,'10 are factually distinguishable
from the Kentucky case since both deal with adoptive par-
ents, neither of whom are related to the children in question.
Furthermore, while it is technically correct that these two
states condemned the "purchase" of children by third party
parents, the condemnation was not so pervasive as to frustrate
the initial purpose of either bargain. Although the court
voiced disapproval of the method by which the children were
procured in each case, 02 the courts allowed both adoptions to
proceed. 103
The third case, In Re Shirks's Estate,0 4 more closely re-
flects the Kentucky arrangement since it deals with an adop-
tion by a relative of the child. Shirk involved a contract be-
tween a daughter and her mother wherein the daughter gave
her consent to the adoption of her child by the mother. In
addition, the daughter promised to go elsewhere to live in re-
turn for a promise that she and her child would each receive
one-third of the mother's estate. 0 5 Although there was dicta
condemning the barter or sale of children on public policy
grounds, the contract was held to be valid and enforceable
against the mother's estate. In so concluding, the Shirk court
astutely recognized that the general prohibition against baby-
buying does not always include contracts between family
100 307 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1957).
101 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. 1978).
102 Id. at 344; Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d at 183-84.
103 In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 397 A.2d at 348; Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d
at 181. In each case, the court's decision to let the adoption proceed was specifically
based upon the best interests of the child. 397 A.2d at 346-47; 307 P.2d at 185. Any
pronouncements of public policy contained in these cases were clearly secondary to
concern for the welfare of the children.
10" 350 P.2d at 1.
105 Id. at 7-9.
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members and those others which would promote the welfare
of the child:106
[A] contract of a parent by which he bargains away for his
pecuniary gain the custody of his child to a stranger and
attempts to relieve himself from all parental obligations,
placing the burden on another who assumes it, without nat-
ural affection or moral obligation, but only because of the
bargain, is void as against public policy. Such a contract
would be a mere sale of the child for money. But the instant
case involves a family compact. The proposal for adoption
upon which the contract was based came from the grand-
mother. It was not prompted by self-seeking on the part of
the mother. Implicit in it is the favorable inference that the
controlling consideration was the welfare of the two-year-old
child.207
Thus, the evil of baby-buying is mitigated considerably when
the adopting parent is not a stranger to the child and when
the best interests of the child will be served by the adoption.
The final extra-jurisdictional case cited in QAG 81-18 is
Reimche v. First National Bank of Nevada.0 5 This case
comes closest to the unique Kentucky situation since it con-
cerns a mother's attempt to obtain specific performance of a
contract providing that the father execute a will for the bene-
fit of their illegitimate child.109 The mother had agreed to
move away, to remain silent about the parentage of the child
and to consent to the adoption of the child by the father. In
return, the father promised to support her and to provide for
her medical care during pregnancy. Additionally, the father
agreed to raise, support, educate and maintain the child and
to leave, upon his death, his estate to both the mother and the
child.1 0 As in Shirk, this contract was held to be enforceable
and not to be violative of public policy. Once again, the un-
106 Id. at 11. Accord, Clark v. Clark, 89 A. 405 (Md. 1913); Enders v. Enders, 30
A. 129 (Pa. 1894). See 59 AM. JuR. 2D Parent and Child § 37 (1971).
107 350 P.2d at 12 (emphasis added).
10l 512 F.2d at 187.
109 Id. For other cases dealing with aspects related to this fact pattern, see An-
not., 65 A.L.R.3d 632 (1975) (contracts to will property); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 500
(1968) (contracts to support illegitimates).
110 512 F.2d at 189-90.
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derlying test was whether the contract was in the best inter-
ests of the child. The court held that the contract furthered
the child's best interests, citing the father's initiation of the
agreement as proof that the motivating factor on the part of
the mother was not pecuniary gain.""- Finally, the court ex-
plained why the arrangement fell outside the policy against
baby-buying: "The fears that approval of such a policy would
lead to the bartering or sale of children are not borne out
when we deal only with agreements between parents or close
family members." 1 2
b. Kentucky cases evidencing public policy
The extra-jurisdictional cases mentioned above consider-
ably undercut any attack on surrogate parenting based on
public policy. Of even more importance, however, are several
Kentucky opinions that were ignored in OAG 81-18. The
Reimche decision itself specifically relied on two Kentucky
cases, Smith v. Wagers' Administrators11 3 and Doty's Admin-
istrator v. Doty's Guardian,1 1 4 both conspicuously absent
from the Opinion.
There is another line of cases that provides even better
support for the Reimche and Shirk holdings, i.e., that adop-
tion contracts between parents or between parents and close
family members that do not violate the best interests of the
" Id. at 189. The consideration on the part of the mother that was sufficient to
support the agreement was her significant detriment in "foregoing her right to child
support through filiation proceedings, relinquishing the companionship and affection
of their child as well as any financial compensation she might have obtained from her
daughter's earnings during minority and her support obligations thereafter." Id.
Clearly the same elements of consideration are present in a surrogate parenting
arrangement.
112 Id. at 190.
3 38 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1931). The holding in Smith is as follows: "[A] promise
by a father to provide for his illegitimate child out of his estate in consideration of
the [unmarried] mother's agreement not to institute bastardy proceedings against
him is valid and enforceable." Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
114 80 S.W. 803 (Ky. 1904). The holding in Doty's Adm'r is that a promise by a
father to support his illegitimate child is legal and enforceable if supported by the
mother's agreement to let the child remain at the father's home and under his con-
trol. Id. at 807.
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child are valid and enforceable." 5 In one case, which roughly
approximates the typical surrogate arrangement, Couple A
approached Couple B and wanted to adopt one of Couple B's
children, whom they knew.1 6 The wife in Couple A was "deli-
cate" and could have no children. Couple B agreed to let the
child go, and Couple A agreed to leave the child their estate.
The Kentucky court enforced this contract without any men-
tion of public policy whatsoever. 1 7 This holding is even more
liberal than any of those previously mentioned because it al-
lows biological strangers to contract for custody of a child.
It is true that most of the cases discussed above are dis-
tinguishable from disputes that could arise under a surrogate
parenting contract. All but Reimche"s deal with contracts
formed after the birth of the child in question. All but Barwin
and LT."1 9 were brought by the children or on their behalf to
receive property promised to them under a contract. Nonethe-
less, they are all illustrative of the limits placed on the public
policy against baby-buying. One Kentucky case, however,
deals squarely with whether parents may contract for the cus-
tody and maintenance of their children, namely the case of
Edleson v. Edleson.120
In Edleson, a husband and wife, having separated, en-
tered into a contract agreeing upon the distribution of their
property and the custody of their child. In a subsequent di-
vorce suit, the court considered the custody provisions of the
contract:
12
'
[I]t is evident that a husband and wife, with each other, can-
not make a contract regarding the maintenance or custody
of their child, which the court is compelled to enforce....
"I' See Broughton v. Broughton, 262 S.W. 1089 (Ky. 1924); Benge v. Hiatt's
Adm'r, 82 Ky. 666 (1885).
116 Small's Adm'r v. Peters, 26 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1930).
117 Id. at 492.
"ll For a full discussion of Reimche, see the text accompanying notes 108-12
supra.
119 For a full discussion of these two cases, see the text accompanying notes 100-
03 supra.
120 200 S.W. 625 (Ky. 1918).
"2 It is interesting to note that the court initially declared one provision of the
contract, which called for the wife to pay all costs in any divorce action, void as viola-
tive of public policy. Id. at 629.
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It is, however, not illegal for the parents, who have sepa-
rated, to enter into a contract with each other for the cus-
tody and maintenance of their child, but the court will not
recognize such contract unless it is one which insures the
proper care and maintenance of the child .... So long,
however, as the court recognizes the contract which has
been entered into between the parents, its provisions
should be enforced.122
Thus, Edleson sets out clearly Kentucky's public policy
regarding custody contracts. Unlike OAG, it acknowledges the
distinction between void and voidable contracts. Moreover,
the rationale of the case is quite simple: No, the courts cannot
be compelled to enforce custody contracts since their primary
duty is to insure the welfare of the child; yes, parents may
enter into such contracts, they are not illegal, and they will be
enforced whenever it is not detrimental to the child to do so.
c. Kentucky statutes evidencing public policy
The Attorney General relies on statutory as well as case
authority for the proposition that public policy voids surro-
gate parenting contracts. KRS section 199.590(2)123 is said to
embody much of Kentucky's public policy against baby-buy-
ing. 124 This statute states that "[n]o person, agency, or insti-
tution not licensed by the department may charge a fee or
accept remuneration for the procurement of any child for
adoption purposes. ''125 The Attorney General felt that this
122 Id. at 631 (emphasis added). See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 583 comment
a (1933); 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 77, at § 1744A. But cf. Wells v. Wells, 412
S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1967). The Wells Court refused to enforce a custody agreement en-
tered into: 1) under conditions of temporary distress; 2) without advice of counsel;
and 3) as merely a temporary solution. See generally 59 Am. Jur. 2D Parent and
Child § 33 (1971).
1 23 KRS § 199.590(2) (1977).
:2, Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 4 (1981).
12 KRS § 199.590(2) (1977). The Attorney General also relies on the first subsec-
tion of KRS § 199.590 which restricts advertising concerning the solicitation of chil-
dren for adoption or custody. Such organizations as SPA might indeed be penalized
for violating this statute should they advertise in the future, but this provision alone
can hardly be taken as evidence of a public policy against surrogate parenting con-
tracts. Public and private adoption agencies could also run afoul of this statute by
advertising. Although the provisions of KRS § 199.590(1) could violate the first
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statute prevented not only the surrogate from receiving
money but also precluded the receipt of money by "all who
are involved in the surrogate transaction since each of them is
involved 'in the procurement of a child for adoption pur-
poses.' ",126 It should be remembered, however, that the SPA
contract is designed primarily to bring about the termination
of the surrogate mother's parental rights so that the natural
father might take custody of the child.127 In this regard, the
first subsection of KRS section 199.590 forbids advertising
"which solicits children for adoption or solicits the custody of
children," while the second subsection proscribes only "remu-
neration for the procurement of any child for adoption pur-
poses. ' 128 The surrogate parenting contract is not truly a
"procurement of a child for adoption purposes" but is simply
a contract for custody.129 Regardless of the literal application
of KRS section 199.590, however, the argument remains that
it is evidence of Kentucky's public policy, and this contention
must be analyzed in light of the overall purpose of Kentucky's
statutory scheme.
It has already been shown that a state's interest in con-
tracts involving adoption and custody is satisfied when par-
ents or close family members are involved and when the best
interests of the child are promoted. 30 It can be shown that
Kentucky has a statutorily identifiable public policy favoring
amendment rights of organizations such as SPA, this Note wil not attempt to
address this issue.
The penalty provision for KRS § 199.590(2) is KRS § 199.990(4) (1977) (repealed
effective July, 1982), which states that violators "shall be fined not less than $500 nor
more than $2000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both."
12 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 4 (1981). The Attorney General does not list the
persons that this may include, but presumably the doctor performing the artificial
insemination and counsel representing the parties could be charged with violations of
the statute.
2I See note 37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the surrogate
mother's commitment.
128 Compare KRS § 199.590(1) (1977) with KRS § 199.590(2) (1977) (emphasis
added).
29 It is fair to say, however, that all parties reasonably expect the father's wife to
adopt the child. See note 95 supra for the contractual recital that indicates the expec-
tations of the parties.
130 See text accompanying notes 104-22 supra for a discussion of cases illustrat-
ing this principle.
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step-parent adoption.13' Assuming that the state's interest in
the child's welfare is satisfied when the natural father obtains
custody of a child under a surrogate parenting contract and
the child's step-parent subsequently adopts him, the Attorney
General's policy argument based on KRS section 199.590 must
necessarily involve policy considerations yet unmentioned.
Two such policies are potentially applicable: protection of
those couples who seek to adopt and protection of the natural
mother.
Unlike many states,3 2 Kentucky allows private'3 3 as well
as public adoptions and does not prohibit couples from paying
for the privilege of adoption. 3 4 Thus, the policy evidenced by
KRS section 199.590 cannot be the protection of couples who
might want to adopt. Apparently, once the state's interest in
the welfare of the child is satisfied, the only other interest
sought to be protected by KRS section 199.590 is that of the
mother who gives up her baby for adoption. KRS section
199.590 is intended to keep unconcerned, black-market baby
131 See, e.g., KRS § 199.473(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1932),
which states in part:
No person, association or organization, other than the department or a Ii-
censed child-placing institution or agency shall place a child or act as inter-
mediary in the placement of a child for adoption or otherwise, except in the
home of a stepparent, grandparent, sister, brother, aunt or uncle ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979) (step-
parent was granted visitation rights to a child despite being a non-parent); KRS §
199.470(4) (1970).
132 See New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 52.
1-3 KRS § 199.473 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
'34 See KRS § 199.590(2) (1977) quoted in text accompanying note 87 supra.
Notice that this statute does not prohibit anyone from receiving payment for procur-
ing a child for adoption - just those not licensed by the Kentucky Department for
Human Resources.
The cost of an adoption of a biologically unrelated child through a licensed pri-
vate adoption agency is quite substantial. For example, it costs five percent of a
couple's yearly gross income to adopt through the Kentucky Baptist Board of Child
Care. The adopting couple must be Southern Baptist, and there is a five to six year
waiting list. Catholic Social Services accepts "donations" ranging from $300 to $1000
for its services. This waiting list is three and one-half years. In either case, the couple
must also pay court costs of around $125 and attorney's fees of as much as $2000.
Cassidy, supra note 3, at 62-63.
A "free," public adoption through the Kentucky Department for Human Re-
sources may take as long as six years, and the couple must still pay court costs and
attorney's fees. Id. at 62.
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brokers from financially overwhelming a mother who is often
young, unwed or poor, and already burdened with too many
mouths to feed.1 35
The unique setting in which surrogate parenting con-
tracts arise goes far toward satisfying the public policy ex-
pressed by KRS section 199.590(2). The process requires a
doctor as middleman, and all parties are represented by coun-
sel. The surrogates are physically and psychologically
screened. 136 Finally and most importantly, "the agreement to
carry the child is entered into prior to conception, free from
the financial and emotional pressure of an unwanted preg-
nancy. Thus, the decision to contract for a child is likely to be
better considered than a corresponding private adoption deci-
sion. 1 137 For all of these reasons, neither the explicit terms nor
the underlying policy of KRS section 199.590 is violated by
surrogate parenting contracts.1 3
A final aspect of the Attorney General's public policy ar-
gument must be discussed. While it has been shown that the
literal terms of the two five-day delay statutes are not violated
by surrogate parenting contracts, 13 9 the Opinion relies on the
policy behind the two statutes for support. The OAG states:
"[T]he legislature as a matter of public policy intended that
the mother not be rushed into making a decision to give con-
sent for adoption [or to file a petition for termination of pa-
See Cassidy, supra note 3, at 62; Marcus, supra note 24, at 17.
For a discussion of SPA's surrogate selection process, see text accompanying
notes 31-38 supra.
137 Comment, supra note 15, at 619. See also Marcus, supra note 24, at 17.
"I A final authority cited by the Attorney General in support of his policy argu-
ment under KRS § 199.590(2) is Professor Ralph S. Petrilli, professor of law at the
University of Louisville and acknowledged family law scholar. "It is ... clear legisla-
tive policy that no one shall profit economically from the adoptive process." Ky. Op.
Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 4 (1981) (quoting R. PErRLLi, KENTUCKY FAMILY LAW § 29.6
(1969)).
It would seem, however, that Professor Petrilli either did not intend for the
quoted language to apply to surrogate parenting contracts or he has lately reconsid-
ered his original position. The Professor has more recently been quoted as stating: "I
think it quite possible to interpret [Kentucky's] statutes as not barring surrogate
mothering ... . They're aimed at an evil, but I'm not sure the evil they're aimed at
is a surrogate mothering kind of thing." Courier-Journal, supra note 25, at 12, col. 6.
' See text accompanying notes 92-96 supra for a discussion of the literal appli-
cation of KRS § 199.500(5) and KRS § 199.601(2).
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rental rights]; rather she should have at least five days to
think it over."' 40 This policy, however, can only be violated if
it is assumed that surrogate parenting contracts will be specif-
ically enforced against the mother should she change her
mind and refuse to terminate her parental rights. As has al-
ready been shown, custody contracts are not enforceable un-
less they are in the best interests of the child.14 ' The surro-
gate's consent prior to five days after the baby is born is no
more legally binding than the decision of an unwed mother
during her pregnancy that she will put her baby up for adop-
tion. The policy of the statute is not violated by well-consid-
ered decisions; it merely seeks to give the mother one final
chance to reconsider. Should the mother change her mind
before a final judgment is entered terminating her parental
rights, she is free to void the contract and take her chances in
a custody proceeding. Thus, while custody contracts may be
unenforceable in some cases, that does not mean they are void
or illegal in every instance.
C. Suggested Analysis of Surrogate Parenting Contracts
The preceding critique of the Attorney General's treat-
ment of surrogate parenting contracts suggests an alternative
analysis that better resolves the interests of the state, the sur-
rogate, and the infertile couple. The position of this Note is
140 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, at 2 (1981). Both five-day delay features were
added to their respective statutory schemes in 1978. 1978 Ky. Acts Ch. 137, §§ 7-8.
An examination of the histories of the consent to adoption statute and the voluntary
termination of parental rights statute illustrates that the five-day delay features
added little in terms of protection.
The judicial rule with regard to withdrawing a sworn consent to adoption is that
such consent may be withdrawn at any time before a final judgment of adoption upon
a showing of good cause. Hill v. Poole, 493 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. 1973); Warner v. Ward,
401 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1966). Essentially the same rule has developed concerning peti-
tions to terminate parental rights. After final judgment has been entered, no one can
revoke a termination of rights. Hill v. Garner, 561 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Commonwealth, Dept. of Child Welfare v. Helton, 411 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. 1967). As a
result, regardless of whether the five-day requirement of either statute is met, natural
parents may rescind their actions for good cause prior to an entry of final judgment
granting the adoption or terminating their parental rights.
141 Edleson v. Edleson, 200 S.W. at 625. See text accompanying notes 120-22
supra for a discussion of this case.
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that surrogate parenting contracts should be considered legal
but voidable custody contracts that are ratified upon entry of
a final judgment terminating the parental rights of the surro-
gate mother. Viewing surrogate parenting contracts in this
way prevents a surrogate from overreaching an infertile couple
who might utilize this method of conception, regardless of its
legality, out of sheer desperation. Furthermore, it is consistent
with Kentucky's traditional treatment of both custody con-
tracts and other contracts in which the state has a special in-
terest. Finally, this approach meshes surrogate parenting con-
tracts with existing custody laws so that reference to those
laws will solve any problems that might arise when surrogate
parenting contracts are avoided.
The principal shortcoming of OAG 81-18 is that it fails to
differentiate between void and voidable contracts, suggesting
that a contract that is unenforceable is therefore illegal. Such
is not the case. An illegal contract is but one type of unen-
forceable contract; many other unenforceable contracts are
merely voidable. 14 2 "The term 'voidable' means simply that
the contract or transaction can be avoided by some action on
the part of one or more parties, but that until such action is
taken, the transaction is a valid one.' 1 43
Once surrogate parenting contracts are characterized as
voidable, the purpose of the statutes cited by the Attorney
General must be seen as the protection of the parties to cus-
tody and adoption contracts. Such protective statutes, as de-
scribed by Dean Williston, "make transactions in violation of
them unenforceable, [but] do not make them illegal, properly
speaking.' 44 To the extent the statutes cited by the Attorney
General do express a public interest,145 such interest is always
satisfied by surrogate parenting contracts. Custody will always
,4 With regard to unenforceable contracts, see D. DOBBS, supra note 77, at §§
13.1-.5.
Id. at § 13.1.
144 15 S. WILLISTON, supra note 77, at § 1770. A well-known example of a statute
of this type is the Statute of Frauds.
I" The previous analysis of this issue demonstrated that the state's interest is
satisfied when the agreement involves the parents or a parent and a close relative of
the child and the best interests of the child are not violated. See text accompanying
notes 104-22 supra for the factors supporting this conclusion.
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lie with a biological parent of the child, and the child's best
interests will be protected either by the surrogate's ratifica-
tion of the contract 14 or through an independent custody pro-
ceeding if she chooses to void the contract.
Analyzing surrogate parenting contracts as voidable
rather than illegal agreements will also avoid the potential for
unexpected and inequitable consequences to the infertile
couple. Surrogate parenting is usually an alternative of last
resort for a scientifically irreducible number of couples who
cannot conceive; therefore, its legality may be of limited im-
portance with regard to an infertile couple's ultimate decision.
In this regard, it must be remembered that one consequence
of a void contract is that the parties are left in the position in
which the court finds them.147 Should the surrogate breach a
contract classified as illegal, not only would enforcement be
disallowed, but restitution would be denied the couple for any
payments advanced to the surrogate or for medical expenses
paid.148 While it may be salutary for a court to refuse specific
performance of a surrogate parenting contract against a natu-
ral mother's will in some cases, it is quite a different thing to
allow her a windfall.
It has already been shown that traditional custody con-
tracts in Kentucky are analyzed under the reasoning urged
herein.149 While these contracts plainly offer the closest anal-
ogy to surrogate parenting contracts, an infant's contract
presents another well-known example of a voidable contract
recognized in Kentucky and elsewhere.10 Minors have the
privilege of voiding their contracts made during minority un-
less such contracts are ratified when the minor becomes of
age. These contracts are not void, however, and other parties
to the contract are bound thereby.'5' One particularly inter-
146 Implicit in this statement is the judgment that a child is certainly better off
with his natural father and stepmother who desperately want him than with his natu-
ral mother who bore him as a service to the infertile couple and who wishes simply to
live up to her contract.
' Miller v. Miller, 296 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1956).
D. DOBBS, supra note 77, at § 13.5.
See Wells v. Wells, 412 S.W.2d at 568; Edleson v. Edleson, 200 S.W. at 625.
180 See generally R. PETRILLI, supra note 138, at §§ 30.2-30.8.
181 Id. at § 20.2.
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esting Kentucky case held that a minor could void the consent
she gave to her child's adoption prior to a final judgment
granting the adoption.152 This case not only bridges the con-
ceptual gap between contracts of minors and surrogate
parenting contracts, it also sets the limit beyond which a sur-
rogate parenting contract should not be voidable: entry of
judgment terminating parental rights of the surrogate.
The voidable contract approach is a workable solution
that best reconciles the interests of the state, the surrogate
and the infertile couple. In the most likely scenario, the surro-
gate would consider her legal and emotional position carefully
before entering into the contract and would happily fulfill its
terms, thus providing a biologically related child for an other-
wise infertile couple.153 In such a case, there would be no rea-
son not to allow the surrogate to terminate her parental
rights'54 nor could there be any question that a final judgment
in the termination proceedings would prevent the surrogate
from later challenging the procedure.1 55 It is not inconceiv-
"I Warner v. Ward, 401 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Ky. 1966) (alternative holding).
53 The comments of Elizabeth Kane after she gave birth are enlightening in this
regard: "I had a glimpse of the adoptive parents in the delivery room. I'll never forget
the delight on their faces - what the sight of the baby meant to that woman. Maybe
it does hurt me a little. So what? It was worth every minute of it." Markoutsas, supra
note 3, at 104.
1 Again, reference to the recent Louisville experience is instructive: "Jefferson
Circuit Judge Earl O'Bannon treated it as a 'routine termination'. . . . He made sure
the Kanes had thought about it, satisfied himself that it was in the best interests of
the child and signed the order." Ward, supra note 58, at B6, col. 2.
'5 Hill v. Garner, 561 S.W.2d at 106. Note the following language taken from
Department of Welfare v. Helton:
The order of the Pike Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of
Mrs. Helton. Nothing has occurred which could be held to have legally re-
stored those rights. So long as that order remains in force, Mrs. Helton
stands at bar as a stranger to the child from a legal point of view ....
Although we are fully mindful of the claims which may be made in behalf
of a mother's rights to her child, we are equally aware of the salutary pur-
pose underlying the laws of adoption .... The entire adoption program
would be utterly frustrated if judgments terminating parental rights were to
be lightly regarded. The prospective adoptive parents, the Department, and
indeed the parents whose rights have been terminated would have no assur-
ance of when or if an adoption could be effected if the termination were
regarded as revocable. That this condition would militate against the best
interests of the child and the public at large hardly needs elaboration.
561 S.W.2d at 108 (quoting 411 S.W.2d at 934).
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able, of course, that a surrogate might change her mind about
surrendering the child prior to termination of her parental
rights. Indeed, this has occurred recently in California."' Ref-
erence to basic custody principles supplies a solution to such
problems once the surrogate parenting contract is acknowl-
edged to be a voidable contract.
Initially, KRS section 403.270 provides for a resolution of
this dilemma by stating: "The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal
consideration shall be given to each parent.' ' 57 This would
put the surrogate and the natural father on equal terms as to
custody,15 and it would simply be up to the judge to deter-
mine what would be in the best interests of the child." 9 Simi-
larly, the couple could receive in restitution any payments or
expenses that were made for the benefit of the surrogate
before the contract was avoided. 60 Secondly, it should be
noted that the contract would not be voidable on the part of
the couple. In the unlikely event that they should breach the
contract and a surrogate choose to keep the baby, she could
institute a paternity action against the father for "the expense
of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and for the educa-
tion, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child."''
In conclusion, the preceding exposition and critique of
15 The resulting lawsuit is discussed at note 70 supra.
'57 KRS § 403.270(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The passage of this statute undoubt-
edly destroys the so-called "tender years presumption" that favored maternal custody
when both parents were equally fit for custody. See Jones v. Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43, 45
n.1 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). For a discussion of the history and development of the
tender years presumption, see Comment, Paternal Custody of the Young Child
Under the Kentucky No-Fault Divorce Act, 66 Ky. L.J. 165 (1977-78).
11" It would not hurt the father's chances if the child was born "out of wedlock."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). "[A] biological father of a child born out of
wedlock has the right to petition and obtain custody of his child if he is suited to the
test, and if such is in the best interest of the child." Sweat v. Turner, 547 S.W.2d 435,
437 (Ky. 1976). Nor should the father's custody rights be affected solely because the
child was conceived by artificial insemination. In this regard, see the discussion of
C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1977), at text accompanying notes 197-200 infra.
"I" This course is apparently the one which will be taken in the California case
discussed at note 70 supra. "After the baby is born, [Judge] Olson will probably order
an investigation of both families and then try to decide what course is in the best
interest of the new baby." Whose Baby Is It, Anyway?, supra note 70, at 83.
160 See D. DOBBS, supra note 77, at § 13.5.
161 KRS § 406.011 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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the Kentucky Attorney General's Opinion on surrogate
parenting contracts uncovers serious problems with its chosen
analysis. There simply is no outright statutory ban on such
contracts under present Kentucky law. Likewise, the Opinion
considerably overstates its policy argument and overlooks cru-
cial Kentucky precedent reflecting on that policy. A Kentucky
court should be aware of these deficiencies and should ap-
proach surrogate parenting agreements as voidable rather
than illegal contracts.
III. A COMPARISON OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND
SURROGATE PARENTING
At its most basic level, surrogate parenting is a technique
whereby couples can have a child biologically related to the
husband although the wife is infertile. The reverse procedure,
enabling couples to have a child biologically related to the
wife despite the husband's infertility,162 is a daily occurrence
throughout the United States. This technique, artificial in-
semination (AI),16 3 accounts for almost one percent of all
births in any given year."6'
Twenty states have already enacted statutes specifically
legalizing AI,165 and the rest largely accept its legality without
question. AI is readily analogous to surrogate parenting; thus,
a successful legal attack on surrogate parenting contracts in
Kentucky could adversely affect the future of AI everywhere.
262 It is noteworthy that a couple's infertility is due to the female roughly 60% of
the time. Yussman, supra note 2, at 107.
lea See generally W. FINEGOLD, supra note 2. Technically, there are three differ-
ent varieties of AI: 1) AIH (homologous insemination), in which the wife is artifically
inseminated with her husband's sperm because sexual intercourse is for some reason
impossible; 2) AID (insemination by donor), in which an anonymous donor's sperm is
used; and 3) AIC (confused or combined insemination), in which a combination of the
husband's sperm and donor sperm is used. Shaman, supra note 2, at 331-32. Surro-
gate parenting is most analogous to AID.
164 Interview with Marvin A. Yussman, M.D., Director of the Department of Re-
productive Endocrinology at the University of Louisville, in Louisville, Ky. (Mar. 24,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Yussman Interview]. The oft-quoted figure of births per
year attributed to AI is 20,000. Shaman, supra note 2, at 331. "There are now 17
frozen sperm banks in this country with at least 100,000 total sperm samples for
sale." New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 46.
16" See note 201 infra for a listing of these statutes.
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There are fundamental differences in the two concepts to be
sure; the disparity in the commitments of the anonymous
sperm donor and the surrogate mother is the primary distinc-
tion between the two methods. 168
The discussion which follows will briefly describe the pro-
cedure involved in AI as it is generally practiced. The legal
precedents for AI will be examined, as will the statutes that
have been passed in response to its popularity. At each point,
the treatment of Al will be analyzed in light of its similarities
to and differences from surrogate parenting. Finally, the po-
tential effect of OAG 81-18 on the continued practice of AI in
Kentucky will be discussed.
A. Artificial Insemination Practice and Procedure
In Kentucky, inseminations are being performed rou-
tinely at the University of Kentucky's Division of Repro-
ductive Endocrinology and at the University of Louisville's
Department of Reproductive Endocrinology.6 7 Upon a deter-
mination that the male is irreversibly sterile, the AI alterna-
tive is discussed with the couple.168 Should they choose to pro-
ceed, they both sign consent forms absolving the donor of
paternity and the doctor from legal responsibility.1 69 The wo-
166 Dr. Marvin Yussman, Director of the University of Louisville Department of
Reproductive Endocrinology and President of the Louisville Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists Society, has described the medical differences between AI and surrogate
parenting. Primarily, the AI donor provides sperm, or mere genetic material, while
the surrogate mother donates more than an egg to the pregnancy. Cassidy, supra note
3, at 63.
Kentucky's Attorney General, Steven L. Beshear, described the legal differences
between Al and surrogate parenting during a television interview. In response to a
question phoned in by one of the authors of this Note, he stated: "Frankly, in my
mind I can't equate a male coming in and taking five dollars to donate his sperm,
with a woman having a baby for pay. It's just not the same thing." Television Ap-
pearance by Attorney General Beshear, Kentucky Educational Television's "Ken-
tucky Journal" (Mar. 23, 1981).
I" Yussman Interview, supra note 164. Inseminations began in Louisville in 1970
with the doctors then performing about five inseminations a month. That figure
reached 40 a month by 1975 and has since doubled as of 1981. Id. At the Tyler Clinic
in New York, doctors perform 15 donor inseminations a day, resulting in 200
pregnancies a year. New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 52.
163 Yussman, supra note 2, at 110-11.
169 Id. Included in this form is a waiver of the couple's right to discover the iden-
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man is then inseminated two or three times each month dur-
ing her period of ovulation until conception occurs. 170 The
overall success rate in Louisville is about seventy-six
percent.17 1
Typically, AI donors tend to be medical students or other
graduate students.1 72 Prospective donors are given a physical,
and a complete medical history is taken.17 3 Some clinics also
administer chromosome tests. 17 4 In Kentucky, once a donor is
chosen, he and his wife must sign forms waiving their rights in
any children, including any right to find out who those chil-
dren are.175 Donors are paid from twenty to thirty dollars for
each sperm sample,176 and most donate two or three times a
week for two or three years.17 7 Clinics match donors with
couples in various ways. Certain clinics allow the couples to
tity of the donor. Id. See 15 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Physicians and Surgeons
§§ 202:81-:88 (1973) (American Medical Association sample forms).
170 Yussman, supra note 2, at 108-09. A University of Wisconsin survey of 400
doctors revealed that 57% of inseminated women involved in the survey became
pregnant after three to four months of A. Sperm Donors: Possible Perils, supra note
9. At the Tyler Clinic in New York, each insemination costs $66. New Frontiers,
supra note 1, at 52.
M Yussman, supra note 2, at 108-09. Success with fresh semen is around 80%,
but when frozen sperm is used, the success rate drops to about 60%. Yussman Inter-
view, supra note 164.
1 New Frontiers, supra note, 1, at 52. There is one sperm bank in Escondido,
California, which accepts only Nobel Prize winners as donors. Id.
173 Id. at 53. In Louisville, Dr. Yussman will accept as donors only married medi-
cal students who have fathered more than one healthy child. This has resulted in a
lower abnormality rate among AI children than among conventionally conceived in-
fants since one-half of the AI child's gene pool is of "proven" normality. Yussman
Interview, supra note 164.
'74 New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 52.
17M Yussman, supra note 2, at 111.
17' As with any other commodity, the price of semen seems to vary. New Fron-
tiers, supra note 1, at 52 ($20.00); Yussman Interview, supra note 164 ($25.00);
Sperm Donors: Possible Perils, supra note 9 ($30.00). Surrogate parenting proponent,
Dr. Richard Levin, estimated that a donor could receive up to $10,950 a year if he
donated sperm every day. Salvato, supra note 7, at 8A, col. 1.
'77 This is the case in Louisville, although any member of the approximately 20-
man donor pool is dismissed after he is responsible for seven pregnancies. This is to
minimize the remote possibility that Al children by the same donor might grow up
and unwittingly enter an incestuous relationship. Yussman Interview, supra note 164.
See Shaman, supra note 2, at 339. At the Tyler Clinic in New York, the average
donor participates for about four years, although some have been donating regularly
for seven years. New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 53.
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fill out a "wish list" that includes a desired height, weight and
hair color, while at others the doctor in charge simply makes
the decision based on similarities of physical characteristics." 8
The typical insemination is marked by rigid anonymity.
Donors are generally disinterested in the children they have
sired. 179 Similarly, the couple tends to act as if the whole af-
fair never occurred. Most doctors do keep records, s0 but the
children rarely discover that they are not the natural offspring
of both parents. Usually, the husband's name appears on the
child's birth certificate as the father, and he does not bother
to adopt the child.''
B. Cases Involving Artificial Insemination
There are no reported cases in Kentucky involving AI,
nor has the Attorney General issued an opinion as to its legal-
ity. The lack of an express legal basis, however, has not im-
paired Al's growth and development within the Common-
wealth.8 2 Only a handful of AI decisions'83 have been
rendered anywhere, and only one by a court of last resort in
any state.8 4  These cases are briefly examined in the
paragraphs that follow in order to clarify the present legal sta-
tus of AI in the United States. 8 5
178 Compare New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 52 with Yussman, supra note 2, at
110.
179 In fact, donors may not even know whether they have been responsible for a
pregnancy. It is doubtful that donors could be as easily procured if their anonymity
could not be protected. New Frontiers, supra note 1, at 53.
180 Id. See also Yussman, supra note 2, at 111.
181 Yussman Interview, supra note 164.
182 For a description of the rapid growth rate in Louisville alone, see note 167
supra.
183 See generally Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1103 (1969).
184 See People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968).
185 The potential legal ramifications of AI are myriad:
[A]rtificial insemination could be asserted as a ground for divorce (as con-
stituting adultery or cruelty),. . . it could be the basis for a criminal prose-
cution for adultery or a civil action for criminal conversation (possibly to be
brought against the physician or the donor of the semen by a husband who
did not consent to the artificial insemination of his wife), . .. it could in-
volve any or numerous parties in an action to determine the legitimacy of
the child, . . it could create complications with respect to child support,
custody, and visitation in a divorce action, and . . ... it has been suggested,
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The first consequential AI decision was rendered in the
New York case of Strnad v. Strnad,186 which involved a cus-
tody determination. The husband was seeking visitation rights
to a child conceived by his wife through AL. He had consented
to the insemination. The court held that the child had been
"potentially adopted or semi-adopted" by the husband, and
he "was entitled to the same rights as those acquired by a
foster parent who had formally adopted a child, if not the
same rights to which a natural parent under the circum-
stances would be entitled.' 8 7 The court also reasoned that the
child was legitimate despite being conceived through Al.8 8
Strnad was rejected in a subsequent New York case involving
Al, Gursky v. Gursky 1 9 The controversy arose when the hus-
band, who had consented to the wife's Al, later challenged the
legitimacy of the resulting child. The court found that the
child was illegitimate and refused to accept a theory of "po-
tential adoption" or "semi-adoption."' 90 The court held, how-
ever, that the husband's consent to the procedure constituted
an implied promise on his part to support the child. He was
estopped from denying paternity due to his wife's reliance on
that promise. 9'
Whatever the reason for the retreat in Gursky, 92 the New
it could even bring about a unique charge of rape, as in the case of a physi-
cian who, by force or fraud, performs the procedure on an unwilling patient.
Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1103, 1107 (1969).
78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963).
10 Id. at 410-11. The court also relied on an often-cited but unreported case,
Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954),
appeal dismissed, 139 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. 1956) (abstract only). That case held that AID
with or without the consent of the husband was contrary to public policy, that any
child born thereby was illegitimate, and that the wife was guilty of adultery. See also
Comment, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 146 (1955).
191 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12.
192 One might suspect that public opinion was responsible for this shift in judi-
cial attitude. Public opinion is generally quite strong on any issue affecting procrea-
tion and reproduction, as witnessed by the Kentucky experience with surrogate
parenting. A most striking example of the fierceness of public opinion in this area is
presented by the reaction to AI legislation introduced in 1949 by a Minnesota state
senator. The senator introduced three bills: one made all AI illegal; one legalized AIH
only; and one permitted both AIH and AID in certain cases. The senator described
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York judiciary felt comfortable enough with the concept of AI
by 1973 to readopt the Strnad approach to the legitimacy
question and did so in In re Adoption of Anonymous.193
There, the parents of an AI child had divorced, and the wife's
second husband sought to adopt the child. The first husband
would not give his consent. The court, citing New York's
strong policy favoring legitimacy and the husband's consent to
the original AI procedure, held that the child was legitimate
and that the first husband could lawfully withhold his consent
to the adoption.194 The court further relied on the case of Peo-
ple v. Sorenson,"" an opinion rendered in 1968 by the Su-
preme Court of California. Sorenson was another case in
which a husband who had consented to AI was trying to avoid
a support duty after his divorce from the mother of the child.
Support was required primarily because the husband was
found to be the "legal father" of the child. This was deemed
sufficient in the absence of a "natural father." The court
noted:
A child conceived through [AID] does not have a 'natural
father' as that term is commonly used. The anonymous do-
the public response as follows:
Exhaustive hearings were had on all three bills. Lobbying against the bills
was terrific. Most of the lobbyists made no distinction between the provi-
sions of the three bills. Certain religious groups became quite fanatical on
the subject. The personal abuse that I and members of my family took was
unbelievable. Vicious, anonymous calls were received by the hundreds. No
member of my family was spared. For a considerable period it was impossi-
ble for my children to run errands to the various shopping centers or other-
wise venture on the streets. In all the twelve years that I have served in the
Legislature, I have never seen anything that would compare with the hear-
ings, etc. in connection with these bills.
Letter from Senator Charles A. Root to Thurston A. Shell (July 28, 1955), quoted in
Note, Artificial Insemination - Legal and Related Problems, 8 FLA. L. REV. 304, 315
(1955). The conclusions of one commentator of this time period are also instructive:
The above reasons form the basic objections to AID. On the other side of
the scale is found the joy of a barren couple in raising a family. Let us hope
for the public good that when the [legislative] decision is made, reason will
outweigh this twinge of humanism and the sterile couple will be left to the
normal procedures of adoption.
Comment, supra note 190, at 153.
193 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1973).
194 Id. at 435.
... 437 P.2d at 495.
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nor of the sperm cannot be considered the 'natural father,'
as he is no more responsible for the use made of his sperm
than is the donor of blood or a kidney.196
The obvious implication from the more recent Al cases is
that a husband who consents to his wife's artificial insemina-
tion will be considered to be the father of the resultant child
when the donor is anonymous. This reasoning could com-
pletely frustrate the surrogate parenting scheme if extended
to include the surrogate's husband, who would then become
the "legal father" of the child. The natural father in the sur-
rogate arrangement, however, is certainly not anonymous in
the same sense as is a typical AID donor, even though he may
in fact be unknown to the surrogate. A final case of the AI
variety, C.M. v. C.C.,197 considerably clarifies the rights of a
non-anonymous sperm donor. The facts of C.M. v. C.C. are
quite bizarre. C.C. desired a child, but she was unmarried and
did not wish to engage in sexual intercourse before marriage.
She and her boyfriend, C.M., were contemplating marriage,
and he offered his sperm for purposes of an artificial insemi-
nation. A sperm bank refused to inseminate C.C. under these
circumstances, but she learned enough from her visit to at-
tempt the procedure herself. After several months she suc-
cessfully inseminated herself with C.M.'s sperm. About three
months into the pregnancy, C.C. and C.M. ended their rela-
tionship, and C.C. subsequently refused to allow C.M. to visit
"their" baby after its birth.""8 In delineating the rights in-
volved, the court considered all of the AI cases discussed
above, focusing on Sorenson and its explicit denial of donor
rights. Not surprisingly, the court distinguished Sorenson and
the others, 99 allowing visitation on the ground that C.M. was
I'6 Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted). The universal interest in alternative methods
of conception is amply illustrated by a comment found in Playboy magazine. The
comment refers specifically to the quoted language from Sorenson. "The California
court's statement as to natural fathers showed a tremendous insensitivity; it was a
kick in the groin to all the artificial inseminators, who work so hard with few of the
rewards of non-artificial inseminators." Weisman, An Unprecedented Pregnancy,
PLANBOY, Mar., 1981, at 21.
1-7 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. 1977).
198 Id. at 821-22.
199 Id. at 822-24.
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not an anonymous donor. C.M. was non-anonymous in two re-
spects: 1) he had known C.C. for some time and they had been
dating, and 2) unlike a typical sperm donor, he intended to
take on the responsibilities of a father.00
The Al decisions provide several useful insights in dealing
with the surrogate parenting situation. For instance, although
the surrogate's husband will consent to the procedure, his
consent is certainly not of the type that would indicate a will-
ingness to accept responsibility for the resulting child. There-
fore, no implied contract or estoppel theory could render him
liable for support or give him parental rights in the child. The
position of the surrogate appears similar to that of the anony-
mous sperm donor. Although her commitment is more sub-
stantial, she does not intend to take on parental responsibili-
ties. Finally, the natural father, as a nonanonymous donor,
should retain parental rights in the child conceived with the
surrogate. While he probably will not have had a personal re-
lationship with the surrogate such as was present in C.M. v.
C.C., he will have intended to take on the responsibilities of
fatherhood.
C. Artificial Insemination Statutes
There are, of course, no statutes yet passed which specifi-
cally deal with surrogate parenting. Twenty states,20 1 however,
have enacted AI statutes in response to the cases discussed
above and the critical commentary they have engendered.0 2
200 Id. at 824.
201 ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-6-106 (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45-69(t)-(n) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1981);
GA. CODE § 74-101.1 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1974 & Supp. 1980);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1980); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-
206(b) (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 40-6-106 (1981); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
49A-1 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-553 (Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239,
.243, .247 (1979); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
7.1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(1)-(3) (1979); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
103 (1978).
202 See generally Shaman, supra note 2; Wadlington, Artificial Insemination:
The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 48 (1975); Note, A Legisla-
tive Approach to Artificial Insemination, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (1968); Comment,
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Exemplary in this regard is the following provision of the Uni-
form Parentage Act (UPA):
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and
with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artifi-
cially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the
husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of
a child thereby conceived....
The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for
use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than
the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natu-
ral father of a child thereby conceived.
20 3
This statute does not purport to cover every AI situa-
tion.204 In fact, it appears to be nothing more than a legisla-
tive embodiment of the Sorenson decision. °5 One readily ap-
parent problem with the statute is that it fails to distinguish
between anonymous and non-anonymous donors. In the surro-
gate context and in cases such as C.M. v. C.C.,206 this distinc-
tion is crucial. As a result, states that hurriedly enact the
UPA in order to aid a number of infertile couples may unwit-
tingly outlaw the only childbearing method a majority of in-
fertile couples can use, i.e., surrogate parenting.20 7 Despite
this problem, five states have enacted the quoted section of
the UPA, either intact or with minor variations.20
Artificial Insemination - A Model Statute, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 341 (1975).
203 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a)-(b).-The act also requires: 1) that the hus-
band's consent be in writing and signed by him and his wife; 2) that the doctor certify
the signatures and date and file the consent with a state department of health (al-
though his failure to do so does not void the consent); 3) that the consent be kept
confidential; and 4) that all records pertaining to the insemination, wherever kept,
are subject to inspection only by court order and for good cause. Id. at § 5(a).
204 "This Act does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised
by the practice of artificial insemination. It was thought useful, however, to single out
and cover in this Act at least one fact situation that occurs frequently." Id. (Commis-
sioner's Comment).
'05 See text accompanying notes 195-96 supra for a discussion of Sorenson.
200 For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 197-200 supra. It is
encouraging to note that at least one state has modified § 5(b) of the UPA to elimi-
nate certain problems raised by C.M. v. C.C. See note 213 infra for a discussion of the
Washington AI statute.
217 It has been statistically documented that the wife is infertile more often than
the husband. See note 162 supra for this documentation.
208 CA. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West Supp. 1980); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-6-106
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The statutes in fourteen other states, which have drafted
their own AI laws, do not vary substantively from the UPA
draft. Most require written consent of at least the husband; 00
many require a licensed physician to perform the proce-
dure;210 many conclusively establish the legitimacy of the
child;211 and some provide for confidential record-keeping.2 12
Only the Washington statute permits donors who are not mar-
ried to the mother to retain parental rights in the child by
agreement.21 3
While it is indeed admirable that these twenty states
have attempted to provide legal protection for infertile
couples and AI children,214 other states considering passage of
an AI law should be aware of the ramifications that such a
statute may have on surrogate parenting and other alternative
conception techniques.21 It is simply a matter of time before
test-tube conception occurs in the United States; embryo
transplants and artificial wombs will soon be medically feasi-
ble.21 " As the surrogate parenting experience clearly shows,
each new technique will be accompanied by its own legal and
ethical problems. Proponents of alternative methods of con-
(1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-6-
106 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1978). Washington has enacted § 5 with the major
change pointed out in note 213 infra.
209 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 20.20.010 (1975). But see the following statutes in
which the husband's consent is presumed: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (Supp. 1981).
210 See, e.g., GA. CODE § 74-101.1 (1971); N.Y. Doi. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney
1977).
211 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1976); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980).
212 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-130 (Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553
(Supp. 1980).
213 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (1979). "The donor ... is treated in
law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived unless the donor
and the woman agree in writing that said donor shall be the father." Id. (emphasis
added).
214 For the most comprehensive Al statute to date, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-
69(f)-(n) (Supp. 1980), reprinted in [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) § 307.0001
(1975).
25 See ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, REPORT AND CONCLUSIONS: HEW SUPPORT OF RESEARCH INVOLVING Hur.IAN
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,058 (1979).
2I See note 3 supra for a listing of authorities on newly developing alternative
methods of conception.
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ception should not also have to contend with the earlier, ill-
conceived draftsmanship of laws covering their predecessors'
methods.
D. Artificial Insemination in Kentucky Following
OAG 81-18
The ten-year practice of AI in Kentucky would be greatly
jeopardized if the judiciary were to adopt the reasoning of
OAG 81-18.217 Statutes and public policy are seldom elastic;
once stretched too far they tend to lose their original scope
and are interpreted even more broadly in future cases. Un-
doubtedly, AI cases and statutes in other states will shape the
development of surrogate parenting in those states. On the
other hand, Kentucky may enjoy the dubious distinction of
stifling the widely accepted practice of AI in its zeal to outlaw
surrogate parenting contracts.
The first basis for the Kentucky Attorney General's Opin-
ion that surrogate parenting contracts are illegal is that they
violate the letter and the spirit of two five-day delay stat-
utes.218 These statutes require a parent to wait five days after
the birth of his or her child before consenting to an adoption
or filing a petition to terminate his or her parental rights. If
an agreement prior to conception that such a petition will
eventually be filed is illegal, however, an anonymous sperm
donor's waiver of parental rights must also be void. Further-
more, the typical surrogate would terminate her parental
rights at the proper time. The sperm donor never legally ter-
minates his rights or consents to adoption.
The second ground for the Attorney General's attack on
surrogate parenting contracts is that they violate Kentucky's
public policy against baby-buying.2 19 KRS section 199.590,
which forbids payment for procuring children for adoption
217 An overview and critique of OAG 81-18 appears in the text accompanying
notes 73-141 supra.
218 KRS § 199.500(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1981); KRS §
199.601(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982). These statutes are dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 79-83 supra.
2I See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra for a discussion of the policy argu-
ments against surrogate parenting.
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purposes, is offered in support of this conclusion. It has been
shown, however, that sperm donors could make nearly as
much money donating sperm220 as Elizabeth Kane reportedly
received for her services as a surrogate.2 21 Furthermore,
money is exchanged for each insemination performed by the
doctor in an AI procedure. 222 Thus, any policy that prohibits
surrogate parenting would naturally proscribe AI as well. In
this regard, two things must be remembered. First, most hus-
bands of artifically inseminated women do not bother to
adopt the resulting child,223 a fact that defeats the literal ap-
plication of KRS section 199.590 in the AI context. Second,
the literal wording of that section does not apply to the surro-
gate parenting situation either.224 If a father's contracting for
the custody of his child is "procuring a child for adoption pur-
poses," it is not difficult to imagine that a mother's payment
for inseminations could be similarly classified.
Simply put, the statutes and the public policy delineated
by the Attorney General were not intended to apply to artifi-
cial inseminations.225 A misapplication is possible, however, as
evidenced by the OAG's approach to surrogate parenting con-
tracts. The factual differences between these two alternative
methods of conception blur considerably on the conceptual
level at which the law must be formulated and expressed.
220 See note 176 supra for a discussion of the financial benefits of donating
sperm.
221 For estimates of Elizabeth Kane's compensation for her services as a surro-
gate, see note 39 supra.
122 See note 170 supra for the price per insemination at one New York clinic.
221 Yussman Interview, supra note 164. This could create many problems for the
child, the non-adopting father, and the sperm donor. For example, KRS § 199.613(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1980) states:
Where parental rights have been terminated ... all legal relationships be-
tween the parents and child shall cease, the same as if the relationship had
never existed, except that the child shall retain the right to inherit from its
parents under the laws of descent and distribution until the child is
adopted.
Id. As a result of this provision, a child could claim againt the sperm donor's estate or
more importantly, his status as an heir of his non-adopting father's estate could be
challenged.
224 The Attorney General appears to concede this point. See Ky. Op. Att'y Gen.
81-18, at 4 (1981).
225 See note 166 supra for the Attorney General's expression of the difference
between Al and surrogate parenting.
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Thus, adherence to the Attorney General's reasoning regard-
ing surrogate parenting contracts would set a dangerous pre-
cedent for all Kentucky couples making use of AI, as well as
for the children conceived through that procedure.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SURROGATE PARENTING
There is a constitutional dimension to surrogate parent-
ing. Both the infertile couple and the surrogate mother have
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution of the
United States. These rights, conferred by the due process22
and equal protection22' 7 clauses, outweigh any corresponding
state interests furthered by prohibitive restrictions on surro-
gate parenting. This section will explore the fundamental
human rights involved in surrogate parenting and will balance
those rights against the relevant state interests. This balance
clearly favors the individual's right to procreate in the way
which, for many, is the only one biologically possible.
A. Substantive Due Process
A determination as to the constitutionality of state re-
strictive action necessarily involves a balancing process. This
balance will depend upon the nature of the right involved. To
comply with due process, a state regulation must at least be
"rationally related to a constitutionally permissible pur-
pose."22 When that regulation infringes on a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution, however, the state must
justify its action by a far more stringent showing. Only a state
interest of extraordinary weight will justify an imposition
upon a fundamental right.221 9 As stated by the Supreine Court
in Roe v. Wade,2 30 a case involving the right to an abortion:
226 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (§ 1).
227 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
228 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977).
22 Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
For a brief history of the origins of substantive due process, see L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 7-3, 8-7 (1978).
230 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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"Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court
has held that regulations limiting those rights may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative en-
actments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti-
mate state interest at stake."23' In effect, the state's interest
in promulgating the regulation is balanced against the per-
sonal interest infringed upon and "the outcome of this bal-
ance will determine constitutionality. '232
1. Surrogate Parenting as a Fundamental Right
The first step in an analysis of the constitutionality of
surrogate parenting restrictions is to determine whether a fun-
damental right is involved. The conclusion that infertile
couples and surrogate mothers have a fundamental right to
agree to a surrogate arrangement is compelled by a long line
of Supreme Court decisions affording constitutional protec-
tion to certain privacy interests. 233 While there is no explicit
right of privacy in the Constitution,2 34 "the Court has recog-
nized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitu-
tion. ' 235 Implicit in this guarantee is the fundamental right to
independently make important decisions, without government
231 Id. at 155.
232 Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1195 (1980).
232 See cases cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152. The earliest case recognizing
this principle was Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
"' The Court as a whole and individual justices have found the source of this
right to be in various amendments of the constitution at various times. See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (privacy right found in the first amend-
ment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (right located in the fourth and fifth
amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (root of the pri-
vacy right found in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights); id. at 486 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (right found in the ninth amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 362 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (privacy right rooted in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty). The Court today appears to have accepted the reasoning in Meyer that a
right of privacy is founded in substantive due process. 410 U.S. at 153.
Controversy over the basis of the right to privacy existed among scholars. Com-
pare Greg, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975)
with Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law
of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965).
235 410 U.S. at 152.
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interference, regarding marriage,236 procreation,237 concep-
tion,238 abortion, 239 family relationships,240 child-rearing4 1 and
"whether to bear or beget a child.
242
The fundamental right to enter surrogate parenting ar-
rangements can be found in any one of three zones of privacy
that have heretofore been given constitutional protection: 1)
the right to be free from state interference with procreation;
2) the right of marital privacy; or 3) the right to decide
whether to bear or beget a child. Although surrogate parent-
ing has not yet been held to fall specifically within one of
these areas of privacy, it is closely analogous to rights pro-
tected in several Supreme Court privacy cases.
243
a. The right of procreation
The right of procreation has been deemed to be funda-
mental since Skinner v. Oklahoma, 4 which struck down a
state statute providing for the sterilization of persons con-
victed of three or more felonies involving moral turpitude.
The Court found that "one of the basic civil rights of man"
was the right to be free of unwarranted state interference with
procreative capacity.245 The statute was subjected to strict
scrutiny24 6 since the right involved was characterized as
2136 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
237 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
238 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479.
239 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113.
240 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Clev., 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
241 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. at 390.
242 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 687 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
243 The report of the HEW Ethics Advisory Board states that these rights are
"reasonably analogous" to the in vitro situation and such an "argument might well be
persuasive." ETHIcs ADVIsORY BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, supra note 215, at 35,048.
244 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
245 Id. at 541.
246 Id. The case was actually decided on equal protection grounds rather than
upon due process. The right was deemed to be fundamental under that approach as
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fundamental.247
As in Skinner, any regulation infringing on the right to
enter surrogate parenting arrangements would directly inter-
fere with the couple's ability to procreate. In situations where
the wife is infertile, surrogate parenting is the only available
means by which the couple can have a biologically related
child of their own.248 Furthermore, state restrictions on the
surrogate arrangement prevent fulfillment of the procreative
capabilities of the husband alone. Quite simply, such restric-
tions confront him with an impermissible choice. He may pre-
serve his marriage and remain childless; he may enter into an
adulterous relationship solely to have a child; or he may di-
vorce his wife and remarry in the hope of continuing his
bloodline. 49 Such a choice is a substantial burden upon the
fundamental right recognized by Skinner: the right to procre-
ate. Hence, any state action must be justified by a compelling
interest.
b. The right of marital privacy
The Supreme Court has decided in a number of cases
that the "liberty" inherent in the due process clause encom-
passes a right to marital privacy.250 Basically, this right pro-
tects freedom of personal choice in matters intimate to mar-
riage or family.251  In Griswold v. Connecticut,"2  a
well.
24' "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race." Id. at 541.
248 Certainly there are a number of infertile women who are treated and eventu-
ally are able to bear a child. There is an irreducible number, however, who will never
be able to conceive or to carry a child of their own. An example is those women who
have had a hysterectomy. Yussman Interview, supra note 164.
24I To some a genetic link is unimportant. Carolyn Bratt, a professor at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky College of Law, stated: "I don't know what makes pe6ple want
the biological link. Being a mother myself, it's the raising (that matters)." Cassidy,
supra note 3, at 63.
220 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. at 479; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
at 390. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
211 410 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Developments in the Law,
supra note 232, at 1163.
252 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives was
struck down on the notion that the choice should be left to
the couple. As one member of the Court stated:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that
the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family
are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental
rights specifically protected.
... The fact that no particular provision of the Consti-
tution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the tradi-
tional relation of the family - a relation as old and as fun-
damental as our entire civilization - surely does not show
that the Government was meant to have the power to do
SO.253
Under the auspices of a right to marital privacy, Griswold
forbade state intrusion into a married couple's decision
whether to have a child.25 4 This right should logically be ex-
tended to protect the couple's decision as to how that child is
conceived. Any decision regarding conception strikes at the
heart of matters protected by the right to marital privacy.255
Thus, absent a compelling interest, any state action prohibit-
ing surrogate parenting would unlawfully impinge upon the
fundamental right to make intimate marital decisions.
c. The right to bear or beget a child
The strongest case for a constitutional guarantee of the
right to engage in surrogate parenting is based on the Su-
preme Court's pronouncements that an individual has a right,
free from unwarranted governmental interference, to deter-
253 Id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
254 For an interesting view that Griswold carried the right to privacy too far, see
Note, The Right of Privacy: A Black View of Griswold v. Connecticut, 7 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 777 (1980).
255 Of all decisions a person makes about his or her body, the most profound
and intimate relate to two sets of ultimate questions: first, whether, when,
and how one's body is to become the vehicle for another human being's
creation; second, when and how ... one's body is to terminate its organic
life.
L. TRIBE, supra note 229, at 921.
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mine whether to bear or beget a child.2"' This right was first
enunciated in Eisenstadt v. Baird,257 which struck down a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons. The Court stated: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrustion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 2 58
Five years later in Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national,2 9 the Court struck down a New York law that re-
stricted the distribution of contraceptives to adults and
criminalized their distribution to minors. The Court again rec-
ognized the right of all people to make unimpeded decisions
concerning contraception, stating:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the
very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices. That decision holds a particularly important place
in the history of the right of privacy, a right first explicitly
recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting the use of contraceptives, . . . and most promi-
nently vindicated in recent years in the context of contra-
ception... and abortion....
[T]he Constitution protects individual decision in matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.260
A couple's decision whether to bear or beget a child, a
constitutionally protected choice, is the very essence of the
surrogate arrangement. Essentially, the decisions of the surro-
gate mother and the natural father to enter into a surrogate
contract involve individual choices: to bear on the one hand,
and on the other to beget a child. If the surrogate mother
chooses to bear a child through artificial insemination, a fre-
258 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 678; Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 113; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 438; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
479.
257 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
25 Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
259 431 U.S. at 678.
260 Id. at 685, 687.
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quently employed 261 and widely accepted 28 2 method of con-
ception, she has a fundamental right to so decide, free of gov-
ernment intervention. 2 3 The right is no less fundamental
because she later terminates her parental rights in favor of the
natural father.264 Similarly, the natural father's decision to be-
get a child is a protected choice.26 5 "A man's right to father
children and enjoy the association of his offspring is a consti-
tutionally protected freedom. '26 There is no rational justifi-
cation for diluting this paternal prerogative solely because the
children will be fathered through the use of artificial
insemination.67
In conclusion, it would appear that both the couple and
the surrogate mother have a fundamental right to enter a sur-
rogate arrangement free of unwarranted state intervention.
This fundamental privacy right could be based on either the
right to procreate, the right to marital privacy, or the right to
bear or beget a child. Any state action infringing on this con-
stitutionally protected practice must be the least burdensome
alternative and must be justified by a compelling state
interest.26
8
21 See note 164 supra for statistics on the substantial number of yearly AI
births.
262 See notes 182-216'supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the ac-
ceptance and legality of artificial insemination.
263 See cases cited in note 256.supra for support of this position.
214 The Griswold Court was shocked at the possible consequences that could flow
from a state statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives. "Would we allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy . .. ."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). Is it any less shocking that a
state could inquire into a woman's motives for having a child and restrict that right if
her motives were not consistent with those the state deemed "proper"?
262 See cases cited in note 256 supra for support of this position.
26 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 535.
267 But see In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (1973). In that
case the court stated: "An AID child is not 'begotten' by a father who is not the
husband; the donor is anonymous; the wife does not have sexual intercourse or com-
mit adultery with him; if there is any 'begetting' it is by the doctor who in this spe-
cialty is often a woman." For a discussion of this case, see notes 193-94 supra and
accompanying text.
26 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
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2. The State Interest in Surrogate Parenting
As previously discussed, the Attorney General seeks to
have surrogate parenting declared illegal in Kentucky because
the practice allegedly violates several adoption statutes and a
"public policy" against baby-buying269 The state's interest in
promulgating these statutes and enforcing this policy is two-
fold. First, the state has an interest in protecting the natural
mother from coercive pressure to surrender her child for
adoption. Second, the state may properly seek to promote the
"best interests" of the child.2 70 Aside from these two principle
interests that might be offered to justify a ban on surrogate
parenting, the state might conclude that surrogate parenting
is an immoral method of reproduction 271 or that it gives rise to
such difficult legal questions that restrictions are warranted. 2
Whatever the state interest urged in support of restrictions on
surrogate parenting, that interest must outweigh the funda-
mental right sought to be infringed in order to be
constitutional.
269 See notes 73-141 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the OAG.
2' See notes 97-141 supra and accompanying text for an examination of the
state interests underlying these statutes.
271 At least one religious group has condemned the surrogate parenting concept
as "immoral." The Roman Catholic Church has consistently taught that artificial in-
semination "outside of marriage, is to be condemned purely and simply as immoral
.... Artificial insemination in marriage, but produced by the active element of a
third party, is equally immoral, and, as such, to be condemned outright." Ryan, Sym-
posium on Artificial Insemination: Religious Viewpoints - Catholic, 7 SYRAcusE L.
REV. 99, 100-01 (1955) (quoting Pope Pius XII in a discourse to the Fourth Interna-
tional Congress of Catholic Doctors, in Rome (Sept. 29, 1949)). See also Note, Thera-
peutic Impregnation: Prognosis of a Legislature, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 291 (1970).
272 Commentators have advanced a veritable parade of horrors. For example: 1)
the surrogate mother decides to have an abortion, Seligmann, supra note 17, at 72; 2)
the surrogate wants to keep the baby and sues the father for custody and child sup-
port, Hiring Mothers, supra note 3, at 59; 3) surrogates begin to advertise, form a
union and demand minimum wages, Cassidy, supra note 3, at 23; 4) the surrogate
suffers medical complications and wants to sue the couple for damages, Witt, supra
note 17, at 73; 5) the surrogate is married and her husband claims paternity of the
child, Marcus, supra note 24, at 17; 6) the child is born abnormal, id.; or 7) during
pregnancy the couple divorces or one of them dies. Id.
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3. Balancing the State Interest and the Fundamental
Right
Initially, it is doubtful that an outright ban on surrogate
parenting is even rationally related to any state interest ad-
vapced to support it. It is clear, however, that those interests
are not so compelling as to justify total infringement of a fun-
damental right.
a. Rational Relationship
The state does have a legitimate interest in protecting its
natural mothers from coercive pressure to give up their babies
for adoption. This interest, however, does not rationally jus-
tify a prohibition of surrogate parenting. As has been shown,
the surrogate agrees to the arrangement before the child is
conceived, she is counseled extensively by professionals be-
forehand, and she is at all times represented by an attorney.17
Thus, the potential for black market overreaching is either
minimal or nonexistent.
Under its parens patriae power, the state has authority
to promote the "best interests" of its children.2 74 A complete
ban on surrogate parenting, however, cannot be a promotion
of the best interests of the child because no child has yet been
conceived. Moreover, once the child is born, the judge will ter-
minate the surrogate mother's parental rights only if to do so
would be in the best interests of the child.27 5 Should a surro-
gate breach the contract and seek custody, the same standard
would apply.27 6 In light of these existing protections, state ac-
tion making surrogate parenting illegal is not rationally re-
lated to promoting the child's welfare.277
173 See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra for a discussion of these safeguards.
274 See generally Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudications: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 226 (1975).
275 KRS § 199.601(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
276 KRS § 403.270(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
277 It seems clear that in most cases couples who want children enough to at-
tempt alternative methods of conception because of their infertility would be good
risks as parents. As Dr. Yussman remarked, "It's such a difficult moral question espe-
cially because of desperate couples who will make marvelous parents." Cassidy, supra
note 3, at 63. A 1978 study reports that couples who seek AI have only one eighth as
many divorces as do other couples. Id.
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b. Compelling Interest
Even if regulations restricting surrogate parenting were
deemed rationally related to one or more identifiable state in-
terests, it would not follow that such regulations would be
constitutional. The fundamental rights involved in a surrogate
parenting arrangement require the existence of a compelling
state interest to justify infringement. Were a court to deem
the state's interests sufficiently compelling, it must nonethe-
less balance those interests against the parties' fundamental
constitutional rights. This approach requires that the restric-
tions be narrowly tailored so as to result in the least possible
infringement. At most, this could result in the permissibility
of limited regulations but would not allow a complete ban on
surrogate parenting. In this regard, reference to Roe v.
Wade278 is appropriate.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman
has a fundamental right to an abortion and that only a com-
pelling state interest could justify infringing on that right in
any way.2 7 9 During the first trimester of pregnancy the state
interest in the mother's health is not compelling and the state
may require only that the abortion be performed by a licensed
physician.28 0 After the first trimester the state may adopt rea-
sonable regulations to promote safe abortions due to its in-
creased interest in the mother's health. 81 Once the fetus be-
comes viable, however, the state interest in preserving life is
compelling, and the state may regulate and may even pro-
scribe abortion, except when necessary to preserve the
mother's life or health. 82
A similar balancing would be appropriate in the surrogate
context should it be decided that the state's interest is com-
pelling. Prior to conception the state's interest in protecting
the natural mother from coercion and in promoting the best
interests of the potential child would support only reasonable
regulations prohibiting coercive contracts and insuring that
2'78 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
219 Id. at 155-56.
280 Id. at 163, 165.
281 Id. at 163.
282 Id. at 163-64.
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the couple is financially and emotionally capable of raising a
child. For example, the state could require that all parties to
the arrangement be represented by an attorney and that they
receive extensive counseling.2 83 During her pregnancy the sur-
rogate mother's interest would outweigh either that of the
state or of the contracting couple subject, of course, to state
restrictions consistent with Roe v. Wade. Thus, in certain
cases, she could exercise her constitutional right to abort the
fetus and thereby avoid the contract.28 Upon birth of the
child, state interests in protecting the natural mother and the
child would remain, and it could adopt narrowly tailored regu-
lations to satisfy those interests. Requiring a five day wait
prior to a final termination of parental rights2 85 or mandating
that the best interests of the child be considered at such a
proceeding286 would be permissible; such regulations strike a
proper balance between the state's interest and the funda-
mental rights of the parties involved. Any regulations, how-
ever, which overburden either the surrogate's choice to termi-
nate her parental rights or the father's right to custody are
tantamount to a ban on surrogate parenting and therefore
unconstitutional.
A consideration of the other state interests advanced, i.e.,
prevention of immorality and avoidance of complex legal
issues, would not change the preceding analysis. Since the ac-
ceptance of AI as a viable method of conception, the once
prevalent notions that AI constitutes adultery and that chil-
dren so conceived are illegitimate have all but disappeared.287
Surrogate parenting begins with AI and is no less "moral"
than that procedure. In any event, a state interest in further-
ing a particular moral viewpoint is not likely to be compel-
283 A limited investigation of the couple, similar to those conducted prior to an
adoption, might also be permissible if not overburdensome. See, e.g., KRS § 199.473
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
28, See notes 142-61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
voidability of the contract.
282 See KRS § 199.601(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
286 See KRS § 199.601(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (repealed effective July, 1982).
287 See notes 193-216 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the aban-
donment of these prior notions.
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ling.288 Implicit in a number of court decisions is the notion
that moral considerations alone cannot justify infringement of
a fundamental right. 9
It is equally untenable that a state could declare surro-
gate parenting contracts illegal simply because they create
"difficult" legal issues. The most difficult contingencies could
be anticipated and provided for in the contract.290 Naturally,
legal battles could ensue when one party "breaches" the con-
tract. Similar problems, however, are inherent in every con-
tract. Furthermore, when the contract is viewed as "voidable,"
a "breach" by the surrogate does not present insurmountable
enforcement difficulties.29 l
In the final analysis, the fundamental rights of the surro-
gate mother and the couple must be balanced against the pro-
tective interests of the state. The outcome of this balance
would permit reasonable state regulations to protect both the
natural mother and the resulting child but would not allow
the state to categorically prohibit surrogate parenting
arrangements.
288 See generally Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct & Child Custody, 46
U. CIN. L. REV. 647, 699-704 (1977); Developments in the Law, supra note 232, at
1202-13. This result is due in part to substantial disagreement over what constitutes
"immoral" behavior. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 383-84 (Cal.
1969) ("No such contention can be presumed about 'morality.' 'Today's morals may
be tomorrow's ancient and absurd customs.' And conversely, conduct socially accept-
able today may be anathema tomorrow."); H. HART, LAW, LrBERTY, AND MORALITY 81
(1963) ("[No one should think even when popular morality is supported by an
'overwhelming majority' or marked by widespread 'intolerance, indignation, and dis-
gust' that loyalty to democratic principles requires ... its imposition on a
minority. ...").
289 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
at 678; In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d
333 (N.J. 1977); State v. Elliott, 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).
280 For example, the contract in the Kane/Ransdale surrogate arrangement pro-
vided that: "[I]n the event that the Natural Father predeceases the birth of the child,
said child shall be placed in the custody of [the physician] for placement through a
private adoption to a designated person upon consent of the appropriate social
agency." Contract, supra note 34, at I XXIL
291 See notes 142-61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept
of voidability.
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B. Equal Protection Analysis
Surrogate parenting restrictions would also implicate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 92 This
principle basically requires that the state afford equal treat-
ment to those who are "similarly situated. '29 3
A prohibition of surrogate parenting would make the use
of Al unavailable when the female of a given couple is infer-
tile. When the male is infertile, however, this same procedure
is accepted and widely available.294 A couple with an infertile
female is substantially similar to a couple with an infertile
male; the only available method of having a child biologically
related to either of them is through AL. A couple with an in-
fertile female receives unequal treatment when the state re-
stricts only the couple's use of AI through a ban on surrogate
parenting. This unjustifiable discrimination violates the
couple's right to equal protection under the law.
Every classification drawn in the law does not violate the
equal protection clause.9 5 Those drawn for a sufficiently good
reason and with a sufficient degree of accuracy will be up-
held.96 In the usual case the classification need only have a
rational connection to the objectives of the legislation.29 7 It is
only when state action discriminates against a "suspect"
class29 8 or infringes upon a fundamental right2 9  that it is ex-
amined with "strict scrutiny."300 Strict scrutiny requires that
292 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
293 See Tussman & Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 346 (1949). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 232, at 1188.
294 See note 164 supra for statistics on the widespread number of births attribu-
table to AL.
292 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
298 See generally Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection
Review of Ordinary Legislative Classification, 68 Ky. L.J. 845 (1979-80); Yarbrough,
The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental and Not-So-
Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal Pro-
tection, 1977 DuKE L.J. 143; Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HAV.
L. REv. 1065 (1969).
2'7 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); McDonald v. Board
of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Lindsley v. Nat'l. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
299 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
2099 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 535.
300 Id.
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the classification be necessary to satisfy a compelling state
interest.30 1
An equal protection analysis of a surrogate parenting pro-
hibition would require strict scrutiny. Heightened judicial re-
view is warranted when the state action sufficiently intrudes
upon a fundamental right.3 0 2 State action banning surrogate
parenting is clearly an intrusion upon a fundamental right,
namely, the right to make independent decisions concerning
procreation.303
Strict scrutiny involves essentially the same "compelling
state interest" test applied earlier in the due process analy-
sis 3 04 The same conclusion must also be reached: state action
barring surrogate parenting is not constitutionally permissi-
ble. The state's prohibition of the use of AI only when the
female is infertile is not necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest, as is obvious from state approval of AI in cases
where it is the male who is infertile.305 Furthermore, equal
protection requires that the least burdensome means of
achieving the state interest be adopted.30 e The rational re-
strictions deemed permissible under the due process analysis
are substantially less burdensome than an outright ban on
surrogate contracts, yet these requirements satisfy the state's
interest in protecting the natural mother and the child. 0 The
Constitution demands that these less burdensome alternatives
be employed.
101 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
IN Arguably, a ban on surrogate parenting involves a gender based classification.
In that case an intermediate level of scrutiny would be appropriate. "[C]lassification
by gender must serve important governmental objections and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives .... " Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
303 See text accompanying notes 273-91 supra for a discussion of th balance of
potential state interests with the fundamental rights inherent in surrogate parenting.
304 See text accompanying notes 228-32 supra for a general outline of this
test.
305 While there is no Kentucky statute explicitly providing for the legality of Al,
it has been openly employed by physicians throughout the state for over ten years.
See note 167 supra for specifics regarding the use of AI in Kentucky.
306 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
310 For a discussion of the state regulations permissible under due process, see
text accompanying notes 283-86 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of the preceding discussion has been to set
out a legal defense for surrogate parenting. There is room for
these arrangements in a state that allows custody contracts
and permits certain infertile couples to utilize artificial insem-
ination. If surrogate parenting agreements are analyzed as
voidable contracts, they pose enforcement problems no more
difficult than those of many other contracts. Furthermore,
overregulation by the state in the field of procreation is for-
bidden by the Constitution.
The furor generated by the first widely-publicized surro-
gate birth in Louisville in November of 1980 represents but
the tip of the iceberg. Science will continue to supply the
courts with novel legal dilemmas as rapid advances occur in
the area of human reproduction. It is inexcusable to suggest
that infertile couples should not benefit from these advances
simply because they lead to unexplored legal territory. The
sole question is whether the law will keep pace with science or
force these couples and their children to find their way as best
they can.
John W. Phillips
Susan D. Phillips
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